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Government agencies around the world produce indexes that purport to measure 
international competitiveness.  The most common version is the real effective exchange rate, 
which is some form of weighted average of the real exchange rates of the country’s trading 
partners.  Such indexes convey a false sense of accuracy as they ignore the volatility among 
the component real exchange rates of the partners.  As long as all real rates do not move in an 
equiproportionate fashion, in a fundamental sense real effective exchange rates are subject to 
estimation uncertainty.  We demonstrate show how this uncertainty can be measured and used 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Suppose the economy experiences a period of considerable monetary turmoil involving a 
surge of inflation and a substantial depreciation of the exchange rate.  Following this period, can it 
be said in any meaningful sense that the “international competitiveness” of the economy as a whole 
has changed -- has it “improved” or “worsened”?  The conventional answer to this question 
involves the use of one of two measures, (i) the internal real exchange rate, the relative price of 
traded goods in terms of nontraded; or (ii) the external real exchange rate, the price-level adjusted 
nominal exchange rate.  The first measure assesses the competitiveness of the economy’s traded 
goods sector in comparison with the rest of the economy (as represented by nontraded goods), while 
the second measure makes this comparison for the economy as a whole vis-à-vis the trading partner.  
As in practice there are multiple trading partners, some form of averaging over partners is needed to 
map multiple bilateral external real exchange rates into one multilateral rate; typically a type of 
weighted geometric mean is employed for this purpose.
1  Official agencies in many countries now 
publish multilateral real exchange rates of this form, which tend to be known as “real effective 
exchange rates” (REERs).  Accordingly, one way to answer the above question is to refer to the 
change in the value of the REER to determine whether international competitiveness has improved 
or worsened.   
There are surely many imperfections with the REER as a reliable indicator of competitiveness.  
One such imperfection that should be highlighted stems from its key building block, purchasing 
power parity theory, which postulates that as a long-run proposition, the nominal exchange rate is 
proportional to relative price levels, the ratio of prices at home (P) relate to those abroad (P*).
2  
That is,  () () S1 P P * =α , where  S  is the nominal exchange rate (the domestic-currency cost of a 
unit of foreign exchange) and  α  is a proportionality constant.  According to PPP theory when 
foreign prices remain unchanged, a rise in prices at home is associated with an equiproportional 
depreciation of the home country’s currency, so that ( ) PP * S PS P * =  remains unchanged at the 
value  α.  The nominal exchange rate adjusted by the price levels at home and abroad, PS P * , 
which is the bilateral real exchange rate, evidently involves a comparison of the price level at home 
                                                 
1 As in practice there are multiple traded and nontraded goods, some form of averaging over goods is also needed to 
define a unique internal real exchange rate.  In this respect, the two versions of the real exchange rate are conceptually 
similar.  For further discussions of the conceptual and empirical issues associated with different measures of 
international competitiveness and real exchange rates, see, e.g., Dwyer and Lowe (1993), Edwards (1989), Harberger 
(1986, 2004), Hinkle and Montiel (1999). 
2 Another problem with the REER as a measure of international competitiveness is that it concentrates exclusively on 
exchange rates and prices, to the neglect of other factors such as macroeconomic policy changes that impinge on trade; 
changes in the exchange-rate system and arrangements pertaining to international trade; changes in the regulatory and 
institutional environment; and productivity changes.     2
with that abroad, where both are expressed in terms of the domestic currency.  This definition of the 
real exchange rate implies that an increase (decrease) entails a real appreciation (depreciation) of 
the domestic currency.  If we use this measure as the basis for a measure of international 
competitiveness, the assumption is that it tends over the longer term to some constant value α, 
which plays the role of the “equilibrium real exchange rate”.  Accordingly, when the real rate 
differs from α , we could identify this as a “disequilibrium” situation; and in terms of changes over 
time, an increase (decrease) in  the real rate could be described as a reduction (enhancement) in 
competitiveness.
3 
The theory of PPP provides a sharp prediction regarding the relationship between the 
exchange rate and relative prices.  As such sharp predictions are a rarity in economics, it is not 
surprising that considerable controversy surrounds PPP theory, and we shall discuss four important 
areas of disputation.  First, does PPP indeed hold over the long run?  Second, if PPP is valid as a 
theory pertaining to the long run, then just how long is the long run?  Clearly PPP theory would be 
of more practical usefulness (and more interesting) if the long run were a couple of quarters, rather 
than a couple of decades.  Third, what exactly are the prices -- P and P*-- to which PPP refers?  
Finally, suppose we observe that the real rate is high in one period relative to some earlier period, 
but relative to some other earlier period, the real rate is lower.  Do we conclude that 
competitiveness has improved or worsened?  The answer to this question depends on in which of 
the two earlier periods the real rate was closer to its long-run equilibrium value α.  We can thus 
label this controversy the “base-period issue”.  We now briefly discuss each of the four 
controversies in turn. 
Does PPP hold? Over the last 30 years there is much heated debate regarding whether or not 
PPP holds and by the early 1980s professional confidence in PPP theory dipped to possibly an all-
time low after the publication of the paper “The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parities during the 
1970s” by Frenkel (1981).  But that was far from constituting the last word on the topic, and since 
then research on PPP theory has been increasing dramatically.
4  There is now general consensus that 
PPP is not a theory of short-term exchange rate determination, but it does offer a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between relative prices and exchange rates, at least for the major 
currencies.  In other words, the deviation from parity, or the real exchange rate, displays mean 
reversion over time and ultimately settles down at some well-defined equilibrium value.  For 
                                                 
3 Note that the bilateral real exchange rate 
* PS P can be interpreted as a comparison of the unit costs (P) of domestic 
producers with their revenue per unit  
* SP , and thus reveal something about domestic profitability.  This interpretation 
might seem to be have somewhat different foundations, but as the identification of 
* SP  with revenue per unit of 
domestic producers depends on PPP holding, such is not the case.  
4 According to Lan (2004), published research on PPP has grown at an average annual rate of about 15 percent, which is 
substantially higher than many other prominent areas of economics.   3
surveys of these matters, see Froot and Rogoff (1995), Rogoff (1996), Sarno and Taylor (2002) and 
Taylor and Taylor (2004). 
How long is the long run?  With the growing support for PPP, the more recent focus of 
research has moved to the issue of what constitutes the length of the long run, that is, the period 
over which exchange rates fully adjust to shocks to relative prices.  The general consensus reported 
in the literature is that the long run is estimated at about 3-5 years.  As such a period could be 
considered too long to be plausible from an economic viewpoint, several possible explanations have 
been advanced for this finding, including non-linear adjustment (Michael et al., 1997), temporal 
aggregation (Taylor, 2001) and heterogeneity and aggregation bias (Imbs et al., 2002).  Another 
approach is to control for the cross-country heterogeneity of consumption baskets by using the 
relative prices of an identical basket, the Big Mac hamburger (published by The Economist 
magazine).  Interestingly, the length of the long run based on Big Mac prices is about 1-2 years, 
which is considerably lower than those based on conventional price indices.
5 
What prices?  It is by no means clear from PPP theory what sort of prices should be used to 
implement the theory.  Some have advocated the use of goods that enter into international trade, 
while others prefer broader-based price indexes, such as the CPI, which include both traded and 
nontraded components.  Additionally, there is now a substantial literature that applies PPP to the 
prices of Big Mac hamburgers around the world, as mentioned above.  Frenkel (1978) argues that 
the choice of the nature of the prices reflects deeper issues regarding the meaning of PPP theory.  
The use of traded goods prices reflects international arbitrage considerations, while those who 
advocate the use of broader price indexes tend to regard PPP as a building block of the open 
economy’s overall monetary structure, which entails the transmission of inflation from traded to 
nontraded goods via substitution in consumption and production, and via the formation of 
expectations. 
The base-period issue.  Usually indexes of real exchange rates are scaled such that they take 
the value of 100 in some base period; and then subsequent values of the index are assessed with 
reference to this base value in determining whether or not there has been a real depreciation or 
appreciation of the currency.  This amounts to assuming that in this base period the real exchange 
rate was at its long-run equilibrium value of α.  Such a decision is not innocuous and the issue has 
not received sufficient attention by agencies that publish these indexes. 
Once the above difficulties regarding the bilateral real rates have been resolved as best they 
can, the individual rates then have to be aggregated over countries to form a multilateral index of 
competitiveness.  As mentioned before, the REER is some type of weighted average of the real 
                                                 
5 See Cumby (1996), Lan (2004), and Ong (2003).   4
exchange rates of the country’s major trading partners.  Typically, a geometric weighted mean is 
used, with weights reflecting the economic importance of the partners, so that for example the 
weights are specified as proportional to exports, imports, total trade or GDPs.  The REER index 
thus created tells us that in comparison to the base period, whether the economy has become more 
or less competitive.  Conventional analysis usually ends here.  In this paper we demonstrate that 
ending at this point is premature as it ignores valuable information contained in the data already 
employed in the construction of the REER.  This information relates to the volatility of the 
underlying bilateral real rates, which can be used to add valuable measures of the degree of 
certainty that can be attached to the resulting REER.  We construct stochastic index numbers of 
international competitiveness, which yield point estimates of changes in the REER as well as 
associated standard errors that reflect estimation uncertainty.  The source of the standard errors is 
the underlying volatility of the component real exchange rates.
6 
The organisation of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we use two examples to illustrate the 
basic workings of the stochastic approach as applied to international competitiveness.  In Section 3 
we present the details of the application of the stochastic approach to the REER index, while 
Sections 4 and 5 deal with the related topics of modelling heteroscedasticity and developing a 
procedure to identify optimal sub-periods during which the country weights can be regarded as 
being fixed.  In Section 6, we implement the stochastic indexes for Australia, and their use in 
assessing the change in international competitiveness is illustrated in Section 7.  Concluding 
remarks are given in Section 8. 
 
2.  Two Examples 
 
To illustrate the basic idea of the paper, in this section we use two numerical examples in the 
following context.  Let  t P  be the price index in the home country in period t, 
*
ct P  be the index in 
trading partner c, and  ct S  be the nominal exchange rate between the two countries.  We can then 
define the corresponding bilateral real exchange rate as 
*
ct t ct ct rP S P = .  Furthermore, write  c w f o r  
the weight accorded to country  c  that reflects the relative importance of  c  to the home country, 
and  D  for the log-change operator, such that  tt t 1 Dx logx logx − = − ; as an approximation  t 100 Dx ×  
is the percentage change in  x  from the period  t-1  to  t.  If the home country has  n  trading 
                                                 
6 The two most prominent approaches to index-number theory are (i) Fisher’s (1922) test approach (see Balk, 1995, for 
a comprehensive survey), and (ii) the economic theory of indexes (see Diewert, 1981, for a comprehensive survey).  
Obscure for about half a century, the stochastic approach to index numbers has been revived in recent times.  Besides 
accounting for estimation uncertainty, the stochastic approach is versatile in that it can generate a number of familiar 
index formulae, as emphasised by Diewert (2002).  For surveys of the stochastic approach, see Clements et al. (2005), 
which answers criticisms by Diewert (1995) of the approach, and Selvanathan and Prasada Rao (1994).   5
partners,  n









∑ = . 
 
This is a weighted average of the changes in the bilateral real rates in the n partner countries, 
1t nt Dr , ,Dr … , where the weights  1n w, , w …  measure the relative importance of each country to the 
home country.  This means that the more important trading partners are more heavily weighted in 
the index.  Note also that the logarithmic nature of index (2.1) means that it possesses the 
homogeneity property that if all of the  n  bilateral rates change equiproportionally, then the index 
also changes by the same proportionate amount; that is, if  ct Dr , =β  a constant for c1 ,, n = … , then 
t DR =β.  Both these properties make perfect economic sense.   
In the first example, suppose there are n = 3 partner countries, each of which has the same 
importance to the home country so that  123 www1 3 = ==.  Suppose further that the home 
country’s currency appreciates in real terms against each of other three currencies by approximately 
10 percent, which implies that the change in each bilateral real rate is  ct Dr .10 = .  In this 
equiproportional case, it is clear that equation (2.1) yields a change in the index of  t DR 0.10 = , and 
as there is no dispersion of the component real rates, the standard deviation is zero, as set out in 
column 3 of Table 1.  The more interesting nonproportionate case is considered in column 4.  Here 
the change in the REER,  t DR , is again approximately 10 percent, but now there is considerable 
variability of the underlying real rates, with a 20 percent real appreciation against country 1, 10 
percent against country 2, while for country 3 the real rate is unchanged.  The standard deviation of  
 
TABLE 1 
THE DISPERSION OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
 
Country   Weight 
Bilateral real exchange rate 
(Log-change × 100) 
    (Percent)  Case 1  Case 2 
(1)   (2)    (3) (4) 
1   33.3    10  20 
2   33.3    10  10 
3   33.3    10  0 
Mean      10  10 
Standard deviation      0  8.2   6
these three changes is 8.2 percent.  While the REER change is exactly the same in the two cases, it 
is clear that the underlying volatility is fundamentally different.  This implies that we should have 
less certainty regarding the value of the REER change when the component real rates move in a 
disproportionate manner, as will now be demonstrated. 
The REER change can be considered to be an estimate of the unknown population mean  µ  
of the changes in the  n  bilateral rates; thus we write  ˆ µ for this estimate of  µ  and   ˆ σ  for the 
estimated standard deviation.  Then the standard error of the mean in column 4 of the table is 
( )
2 ˆ n 8.2 3 4.7 all 10
− σ= = × .  If we wish to test the hypothesis that  0 µ =µ , then under the 
assumption that the individual real rates are iid and normal, the statistic ( ) 0 ˆˆ n µ−µ σ follows a  t  
distribution with ( ) n-1  = 2   degrees of freedom.  Accordingly, if we are interested in whether or 
not the country’s competitiveness has deteriorated over the period, we would test the hypothesis 
that it remained unchanged, so that  0 µ= , against the alternative  0 µ > .  Using the data of column 4 
of Table 1, the test statistic associated with this hypothesis is ( ) 10 0 3 8.2 2.11 −= .  As this is less 
than the critical value at the 5 percent level of  2 t  of 2.92 (using a one-tale test), we are unable to 
reject the hypothesis of constant competitiveness.  Another way of expressing the result is in terms 
of the 95-percent confidence interval for the change in competitiveness, which is  ( ) ˆˆ 2.92 n µ± σ  
or 10 13.7 ± (all 
2 10
− × ).  Accordingly, we can be 95 percent confident that the interval [ ] 23.7, -3.7  
contains the population parameter  µ;  the large size of the interval reflects both the small sample 
and the extent of dispersion of the underlying real rates.   
The above example shows that in the case in which there is no variability among the 
individual real exchange rates, there is no uncertainty that the REER index has risen by 10 percent, 
so there has been an unambiguous deterioration in the country’s international competitiveness.  But 
in the more realistic case of disproportionate movement of the real exchange rates, while the point 
estimate of the change in the REER is the same (10 percent), the underlying volatility leads to 
estimation uncertainty of the change in competitiveness.  In fact, in the example, this uncertainty is 
so large that we are unable to reject the hypothesis that competitiveness was unchanged.   
That the above considerations are of practical importance is illustrated by the second example 
based on real world data.  Here we use Australia as the home country with n = 26 trading partners; 
and allow for unequal weights by employing trade weights.  We evaluate the change in the REER, 
defined by equation (2.1), for the transition from t 1 1994Q4 − =  to t 1995Q1 = , which yields 
2
t DR 2.3 10







7  This change in competitiveness is represented by the horizontal line in panel A of Figure 1.  
Also included in this figure are the real exchange rate changes for the 26 countries  ct Dr , with two 
adjustments.  First, as  t DR  is a weighted mean, we multiply each  ct Dr  by the respective weight 
c w .  Second, to make the term  cc t wD r ×  of the same order as  t DR , we multiply the former by 26, 
as then the unweighted average over the 26 countries of  cc t 26 w Dr × ×  equals  t DR .  The weighted 
standard deviation corresponding to the weighted mean (2.1) is  ()
2 n
c1 cc t t wD r D R = ∑ − , which   
 
FIGURE 1 
TWO EPISODES OF CHANGES IN REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
 


















































































































































































































































                                                 
7 Details of the underlying data will be given subsequently in the paper. 
Mean ± 1SD
Mean = -2.3 
SD = 1.5 
Log-changes × 100 
Log-changes × 100 
Mean ± 1SD
Mean = -2.2 
SD = 5.7  8
equals 
2 1.5 10
− ×  for this example with  n = 26.  The figure also contains the one-standard-deviation 
band around the mean.  Next, we apply exactly the same approach to the transition from 1998Q3 to 
1998Q4, and panel B of the figure contains the results.  As can be seen, the mean is close to what it 
was in the earlier period (about -2 percent), but now there is considerably more dispersion as the 
standard deviation is 5.7 percent, more than three times the previous value.  Even if we omit the two 
outlying observations for the US and Japan, the standard deviation is 
2 2.9 10
− × , which is still 
substantially higher than in the first period.
8  The conclusion is that while competitiveness improves 
by approximately the same amount in the two periods, because of the higher volatility of the 
underlying real rates we can have much less certainty about the result for the second period.  This 
becomes even clearer if we test the hypothesis of constant competitiveness in the two periods.  For 
the two cases, the t-values are  2.3 26 /1.5 7.82 −× = −  and  2.2 26 /5.7 1.97 −× = − . Accordingly, 
the hypothesis of no change can be safely rejected for  1995Q1,  but we are unable to do so for 
1998Q4. 
Although the examples above are simple, they still illustrate the key point of the paper: As 
current measures of international competitiveness are deterministic and neglect estimation error, 
they give a false sense of accuracy.  In what follows, we elaborate this basic idea within the context 
of the stochastic approach to index numbers. 
 
3.   A Stochastic REER Index 
 
  In this section we apply the stochastic approach to index-number theory to real exchange 
rates.  As before, let   ct r   be the bilateral real exchange rate between country  c  (c 1, ..., n) =   and 
the base (or numéraire) country, and let   ct ct c,t 1 Dr logr logr − = −   be its log-change (t 1, ..., T) = . 
Suppose that each   ct Dr   is made up of three components, (i) a time component   t α , (ii) a country 
component   c β , and (iii) a zero-mean random component   ct ε : 
 
(3.1)  ct t c ct Dr = α+ β+ ε. 
 
As   t α   plays the role of the common trend in all  n  exchange rates, it can be thought of as isolating 
the influence of changes stemming from the numéraire country.  Accordingly,   t α   is interpreted as 
the change in the multilateral real exchange rate for this country, or more simply, the change in the 
REER index. 
                                                 
8 When these two countries are omitted, weights of the remaining 24 countries are renormalised such that they have a 
unit sum.  9
  The change in the  
th c   exchange rate relative to the multilateral rate is   ct t c ct Dr −α =β +ε ,  
so that   cc t t E(Dr ) β= − α   is the expected value of this relative change.  In other words,   c β   is the 
expectation of the change in the deflated exchange rate of country  c.  Accordingly, as   c β   excludes 
the impact of the numéraire country, this component reflects the trend change in the exchange rate 
of  c  stemming from developments that occur outside the home country.  Such a trend change could 
be associated with long-term productivity developments as discussed by Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964).  To identify model (3.1) we assume that a country-share weighted-average of the 
country components is zero, 
n
c cc w0 β= ∑ , with   c w   the  
th c   country share.  Thus the differential 
productivity changes, or other developments leading to long-term changes in real exchange rates, 
average out to zero over all countries.  Finally, the random term in equation (3.1) measures the 
impact of all other factors, and is assumed to be heteroschedastic but independent across countries. 
  If we multiply both sides of (3.1) by   c w   and then apply least squares, we obtain 




tc c t c c t t
c1 t1
1 ˆ ˆˆ wD r, ( D r ) .
T ==
α= β= − α ∑∑  
 
Thus the estimator of   t α   is a country-share weighted average of the changes in the  n  bilateral 
rates.  This has the sensible property that more weight is accorded to the currencies of those 
countries that are more economically important to the numéraire country.  This expression for   t ˆ α   
is exactly the same as index (2.1).  The estimator   c ˆ β   is the sample mean of the changes in the 
deflated exchange rate of country  c.  Thus it can be seen that expressions (3.2) have attractively 
simple interpretations. 
 
4.   Modelling Heteroschedasticity 
 
  To compute the standard errors of the estimators of the index (3.2), one could use 
conventional least-squares theory, on the basis of homoscedasticity.  An alternative, to be followed 
here, is to use a heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix.
9  This section uses Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques to evaluate several alternative versions of the heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix in the context of the stochastic index model. 
                                                 
9 Clements and Izan (1987) use the first approach, while Crompton (2000) and Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2004) use 
the second.  Note that when Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2004) set out White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix, they erroneously omit from their equation (10) a scalar, n.   10
  We write model (3.1) for  c 1, ..., n =   and  t 1, ..., T =   by defining   ] [ n 2 1 ′ ′ ′ ′ = y y y y   , 
with  ] y y y [ cT 2 c 1 c c ′ =   y   and   ct c ct yw D r = ;  I X c c w =   with  I   the identity matrix of 
order  T; 
1
12 2 3 3 n n []
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After multiplying both sides of equation (3.1) by   c w    and substituting out the identification 
constraint   c cc w0 β= ∑ ,  the model can be written in vector form as  
 
(4.1)  = + yZ γξ  ,  
 
where   1T 1 n 1 [] − ′ =α α β β γ        and   11 1T n1 nT [] ′ = ξξ ξξ ξ         , with   ct c ct w ε = ξ . 
  The heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimator (HCCME) of the coefficient 
vector  γ  in model (4.1) is  
 
(4.2) 
1 1 ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( Var
− − ′ ′ ′ = Z Z Z Ω Z Z Z γ . 
 




ctˆ a ξ ,  where   ct ˆ ξ   is the 
OLS residual.  Following Davison and Flachaire (2001) and Flachaire (2001, 2003), we refer to the 
White (1980) version of (4.2), corresponding to   1 a
2
ct = ,  as  HC0 .  MacKinnon and White (1985) 
consider other possible forms of the HCCME, with   ct a   defined as 
 
(4.3)  1c t
nT
HC : a
nT (n T 1)
=
−+ −
















where   ct h  i s  
th ) t c ( ×   element on the main diagonal of the  nT nT ×   matrix   Z Z Z Z ′ ′
−1 ) (.   
MacKinnon and White show that in finite samples, all the above forms of the HCCME can be 
seriously biased, especially in the presence of observations with high leverage.  Moreover, Chesher 
and Jewitt (1987) show that the extent of bias is related to the structure of regressors in the model.  11
  In conventional cases, the residual bootstrap method can be used to provide finite-sample 
inferences regarding the coefficients  γ.  However, this method generally fails for the case of 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form, since such heteroscedasticity cannot be mimicked in the 
bootstrap distribution.  One way to get around the problem is to use the wild bootstrap (see, e.g., 
Davison and Flachaire, 2001, Flachaire, 2003, and Godfrey and Orme, 2002).  The simulations in 
Cribari-Neto and Zarkos (1999) and Flachaire (2001) show that if the generated wild bootstrap 
errors are the products of the OLS residuals, the term  ct a  defined in (4.3) above and a probability 
distribution with mean of zero and variance of one, then (i) the wild bootstrap estimators and the 
HCCME estimators based on the same   ct a   exhibit similar finite-sample behaviour; (ii) the wild 
bootstrap estimators are substantially worse due to experimental errors; and (iii) the HC2 of (4.3) 
has smallest bias and mean squared error. Flachaire (2001) proves that for a fixed number of 
observations and under the above-mentioned wild bootstrap data-generating process, the wild 
bootstrap covariance matrix estimator is equal to the HCCME (4.2).   
  In order to determine which covariance estimator performs the best when the regressors are of 
the form Z, we carry out Monte Carlo simulation experiments.  As our data are two-dimensional 
(countries × time), we shall consider the  2 × 2  structure of heteroscedasticity set out in panel A  
of Table 2.  As can be seen, we split the time period into two sub-periods, each with an equal 
number of observations.  Similarly we split the  n  countries equally, and then consider the various 
combinations of homo/heteroscedasticity.  While the 50:50 split is somewhat arbitrary, it serves to 
keep the analysis manageable and at least can provide a guide to more complex cases.  For the 
simulations, we specify the scedasticity function as  
 
TABLE 2 
THE STRUCTURE OF HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
 
Countries   
Time periods 
First group  Second group 
A. Schematic Structure 
First half 
Countries: Homoscedastic 
Time:        Homoscedastic 
Countries: Heteroscedastic 
Time:        Homoscedastic 
Second half  Countries: Homoscedastic 
Time:         Heteroscedastic 
Countries: Heteroscedastic 
Time:        Heteroscedastic 
B. Parametric restrictions in equation (4.4) 
First half  1 1 η= ,    2 1 η =   1 1 η ≥ ,    2 1 η =  
Second half  1 1 η= ,    2 1 η ≥   1 1 η ≥ ,    2 1 η ≥   12





uc n / 2 , t T / 2
uc n / 2 , t T / 2
uc n / 2 , t T / 2




ηη ≥ ≥ 
 
 
where, following Long and Ervin (2000),   ct u   is alternatively drawn from a  z,  
2
5 χ ,  or   5 t   
distribution.  The values of   i η   in equation (4.4) are specified in panel B of Table 2. 
  The following simulation procedure is adopted:  
•  First, we specify the values of relevant variables.  We set the number of countries  
15 n=   and specify the number of time periods  T  as set out in Table 3.  Cases 1, 
2 and 3, respectively, correspond to the number of periods less than, equal to, and 
greater than the number of countries.  The reason for this is that in the next 
section, we classify the whole sample period into a number of sub-periods that 
unavoidably involve these three situations.  We set the coefficients   t α   and   c β   
at   t
~ α   and   c
~
β ,  the values of which are given in Table 3.  The values of the 
country shares,   c w ~ ,  are also given in Table 3.   
 
TABLE 3 
PARAMETRIC SETUP FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY SIMULATIONS 
Case 1: T=4 and n=15  Case 2: T=15 and n=15  Case 3: T=42 and n=15   
c, t  t α    
c β     c w     t α    
c β     c w     t α    
c β     c w    
1  -1.0 -1.9746 8.26  -1.0 -1.9746 8.26  -1.0 -1.9746 8.26 
2  -1.1 1.5061 1.62  -1.1 1.5061 1.62  -1.1 1.5061 1.62 
3  -1.2  -0.1292 10.46  -1.2  -0.1292 10.46  -1.2  -0.1292 10.46 
4  -1.3 0.7370 3.07  -1.3 0.7370 3.07  -1.3 0.7370 3.07 
5  -  0.7233 3.25  -1.4 0.7233 3.25  -1.4 0.7233 3.25 
6  -  0.6372 7.18  -1.5 0.6372 7.18  -1.5 0.6372 7.18 
7  -  0.1995 14.10  -1.6  0.1995 14.10  -1.6  0.1995 14.10 
8  -  -0.9154 6.93  -1.7 -0.9154 6.93  -1.7 -0.9154 6.93 
9  -  -3.0734 2.94  -1.8 -3.0734 2.94  -1.8 -3.0734 2.94 
10  -  1.8308 14.51  -1.9  1.8308 14.51  -1.9  1.8308 14.51 
11  -  -0.7895 1.79  -2.0 -0.7895 1.79  -2.0 -0.7895 1.79 
12  -  -0.7480 10.51  -2.1  -0.7480 10.51  -2.1  -0.7480 10.51 
13  -  -0.8016 7.79  -2.2 -0.8016 7.79  -2.2 -0.8016 7.79 
14  -  0.5999 2.00  -2.3 0.5999 2.00  -2.3 0.5999 2.00 
15  -  -0.4475 5.59  -2.4 -0.4475 5.59  -2.4 -0.4475 5.59 
16 -  -  -  -  -  - -2.5 -  - 
  -  -  -  -  -  -    -  - 
42 -  -  -  -  -  - -4.1 -  - 
Note:   All entries are to be divided by 100.   13
•  Second, we generate the disturbances according to equation (4.4) with four 
combinations of   1 η   and   2 η ,  (i)  1 1 = η ,   1 2 = η ;  (ii)  1 1 = η ,   5 2 = η ;  (iii)  5 1 = η ,  
1 2 = η ; and (iv)  5 1 = η ,   5 2 = η .  The choice of   i 1 η >   ensures a certain level of 
heteroscedasticity in the error variance. 
•  Third, we carry out 1,000 simulation trials.  In each of the   1000 , ... , 1 s =   trials, we 
generate an  nT ×   random error vector  
(s)





ct w ~ / ξ = ε .  The dependent variable is then computed as  
(s) (s)
ct t c ct Dr =α+β+ε     .  
This equation is transformed into vector form (4.1) and the OLS estimates of its 
coefficients in trial  s  are denoted by 
(s)
t ˆ α  and 
(s)
c ˆ β .  We then compute the four versions 
of the heteroscedasticity-corrected covariance matrix of coefficient estimates, HCm  
(3 , , 0 m … = )  using the residuals  
(s) (s) (s) (s) (s)
ct c ct c ct t c ˆˆ ˆˆ ww [ D q ] ξ =× ε = − α − β    .   
•  Fourth, the results from the simulations are summarised.  Let  
(s) ˆ γ   be the vector of 
estimates of all coefficients in trial  s,  
(s) (s) (s) (s)
1T 1 n 1 ˆˆ ˆˆ [, , , ,] − ′ αα ββ …  … ,  and let  
(s)
k ˆ γ   be the  
k
th  element of  
(s) ˆ γ .  We summarise the results from 1,000 trials by computing the 
mean and root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of  
(s)















  =γ − γ   ∑ , 
 
and the mean-squared error of the standard error of  
(s)










  =   ∑ , 
 
where   ( )
(s)
mk diag HC   is the  
th k   diagonal element of the  
th m   HCCME  at trial  s.   
•  Finally we analyse the sampling variability.  We need to compare the standard error 
based on HCm of each of the   1 n T − +   estimated coefficients with the corresponding 
true sampling variability as measured by the RMSEs.  A simple way to make this 










  ∆= −   +−∑ . 
 
 We use the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test to see whether the error terms   ct ξ   defined by 
equation (4.4) are heteroscedastic.  As can be seen from columns 3, 8 and 13 of Table 4, when  
1 2 1 = η = η ,  no matter which error structure is used, the error terms are always homoscedastic.  For 
the remaining three combinations of   1 η   and   2 η ,  if the base error terms   it u   are distributed as  
2 χ   or  t ,  then the   ct ξ   are heteroscedastic in all 1,000 experiments in panels B and C of Table 4.   14
TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF FOUR VERSIONS OF STANDARD ERRORS  
 
Error structure of   ct u   Hetero-
scedasticity 
parameters  Normal  Chi Square  Student t 
 


































   (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12)  (13)  (14) (15) (16) (17) 
A.  Case 1: T=4 and n=15 
1 1  0 8.8  1.3  0.7 16.8  0  11.5  1.9  1.4 22.2  0  18.1  0.8  0.2 23.0 
1 5  50.5 172.7  69.8  65.9 274.5  64.1  249.1  88.1  79.6 470.3  79.1  374.0  78.0  68.1 495.2 
5 1  65.3 36.8  33.4 34.0  182.9  83.3  27.6 54.2 58.4  286.0  94.5  53.2 35.6 37.2  267.2 
5 5  100  1082.5 1136.9 1171.0 3237.5  100  941.1 1714.1 1820.5 5684.6  99.8  1492.8 1542.6 1592.8 5247.5 
B.  Case 2: T=15 and n=15 
1 1  0 2.4  0.4  0.2 3.3  0  2.3 0.4 0.4 5.4  0  6.0 1.1 0.4 3.4 
1 5  100 50.8  23.9  20.9 63.4  100  55.9 52.4 58.6  159.7  100  120.0 49.7 39.2 77.1 
5 1  100 32.7  12.1  10.7 51.8  100  40.5 19.2 18.4 75.1  100  78.1 26.8 18.0 59.6 
5 5  100 779.5  464.9  433.3 956.4  100  1159.3 1260.8 1350.0 2714.8  100  1510.9  788.7  659.3 1213.0 
C.  Case 3: T=42 and n=15 
1 1  0 5.1  1.4  0.5 3.0  0  4.5 0.9 0.4 5.7  0  8.5 2.3 0.9 5.4 
1 5  100 76.3  26.2  14.7 45.4  100  80.4 54.5 57.7 163.3  100  111.0  34.8  19.3 89.5 
5 1  100 66.1  18.8  8.9 46.0  100  72.2 19.9 10.0 68.8  100  103.1 27.7 11.5 79.4 
5 5  100 981.7  353.3  218.3 682.3  100  1653.8 1484.2  1553.9 3129.5  100  1321.5  433.4  274.5 1317.6 
Notes:   1. The elements in columns 3, 8 and 13 are percentages. 
    2. The elements in columns 4-7, 9-12 and 14-17 are to be divided by 1,000. 
    3. The shaded entry in a given sub row of four elements is the minimum of these elements.  15
But when the number of time periods falls (with the number of countries fixed), we see from panel 
A that the Breusch-Pagan test identifies a smaller number of cases of heteroscedasticity when   
1 2 1 ≠ η ≠ η .   
The simulation results show that the estimates of   t
~ α   and   c
~
β   (not reported) are very close 
to their true values shown in Table 3, indicating unbiasedness.  The value of   m ∆   for   3 , , 0 m … =  
are contained in columns 4-7, 9-12 and 14-17 of Table 4.  As can be seen from panel A, the  ∆2  
values are smallest (indicated by the shaded cells) in 50 percent of the cases.  This percentage is 83 
and 100, respectively, in panels B and C.  On the basis of this evidence, it would seem to be 
reasonable to conclude that for model (4.1) HC2  is the best-performing estimator of the covariance 
matrix.  This result is consistent with those reported in the literature for other models (see, e.g, 
Chesher and Jewitt, 1987). 
 
5.   Optimal Sub-Periods 
 
  According to equation (3.2), the least-squares estimator of the REER change is a country-
share weighted of the  n  bilateral rates,  
n
c1 cc t wD r = ∑ .  As the country weights are time-invariant 
here, this approach should be interpreted as referring to sub-periods during which these shares can 
be treated as approximately constants.  In a similar vein, in the REER index published by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), discussed in Appendix 1, the weights are constant within sub-
periods.  In this section we present and evaluate a procedure to divide up the whole period into an 
“optimal” number of sub-periods within which the weights are constants. 
 Let    ct w   be the weight of country  c  in period  t.  As we wish to identify the time at which 
the weights change substantially, we consider a scalar function of the weight vector,   
1t nt g(t) g(w , ,w ) = … .  This function should reflect not only the average distance of the weights 
from their previous values, but also the economic importance to the home country of each country’s 




1t nt ct ct c,t 1
c1
g(w , ,w ) w (w w ) −
=
=− ∑ … . 
 
In words, this is the square root of the weighted sum of squared changes in the country   
shares.  If  g(t)  takes a large value in comparison with its average, then we shall declare   
that period  t  represents a “break point” signifying the start of a new sub-period with a new set of 
weights.  To operationalise this idea, we use the average of  g(t)  from   0 t  to t-1,    16
0
t1
t 00 g(t ,t 1) [1 (t t 1)] g( )
−
τ= −= −− τ ∑ .  Thus if   0 g(t) g(t ,t 1) d − −>, where  d  is some pre-specified 
number, we conclude that period  t  is the starting point of a new sub-period; if the reverse is true, 
then  t  remains part of the pre-existing sub-period.  As the volatility of the weights increases, for a 
given value of  d  we expect the procedure to identify more sub-periods.  Additionally, as the value 
of  d  increases, the number of sub-periods is expected to fall. 
  Next, we use a Monte Carlo simulation to investigate the performance of our criterion.   
Suppose there are 10 countries and 6 sub-periods each of which consists of 20 observations, so that 
the total number of observations is  6 20 120 × = .  The pre-determined mean weights are presented 
in Table 5.  The simulation is carried out as follows.  In each sub-period, we generate  20 6×  
random weights which have the property of meandering around the values in each cell in Table 5,  
ij m , in the range  ij ij [m u(0,1)*h, m u(0,1)*h] −+ , where  u(0,1)  is a random variable drawn 
from a uniform distribution over the range (0,1), and  h  is a constant.  The distance of a realised 
share from its mean is thus   u(0,1)*h ± , so that the larger is  h, the higher is the variability of the 
weights.  Each set of generated weights is renominalised such that it has a unit sum.  Then we 
specify positive values of  d  and  h  and for each  2t1 2 0 ≤ ≤ ,  and compute the difference 
between  g(t) and  0 g(t , t-1).  This procedure is repeated 1,000 times. 
For given values of the threshold and variability parameters  d  and  h,  the procedure 
identifies the optimal number of sub-periods.  We summarise the results by giving in Table 6 the 
means and standard deviations of the number of sub-periods identified for various values of  d  and  
h.  For example, as the standard deviation is zero, the entry in the top left corner reveals that for   
h = .001  and d = .005, the procedure identifies the number of sub-periods as  6  in all 1,000 trials.  
Accordingly, as  6  is the true number of sub-periods, here the performance of the procedure could 
not be better.  Several comments can be made about the other results in Table 6.  First, as we go 




MEAN WEIGHTS FOR THE SIMULATION 
 
Mean weight of country 
Sub-period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1  0.24 0.26 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.025  0.025  0.02 
2  0.27 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.025  0.025  0.02 
3  0.28 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.075 0.02  0.025 0.01  0.02 
4  0.31 0.25 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.095 0.035 0.02  0.01  0.02 
5  0.35 0.245  0.09 0.09 0.06 0.075 0.045 0.015 0.01  0.02 
6  0.38 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  17
TABLE 6 
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF SUB-PERIODS, SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Variability parameter  h  Threshold 
parameter d 
0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.005  6.0  6.7 11.4 19.0 25.3 28.8 30.0 
  (0.0) (0.8) (1.3) (2.7) (2.1) (1.5) (1.0) 
0.010  6.0  6.00 6.0  6.7  8.7 12.2 16.2 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.9) (1.7) (2.3) (2.7) 
0.015  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.7 7.8 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.4) (0.9) (1.5) 
0.020  6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) 
0.025  5.5 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.8 
  (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) 
0.030  2.0 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 
  (0.0) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (1.0) 
Note:   Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the number of sub-periods. 
 
as expected.  Second, for smaller values of  d  (d = 0.005, 0.010, and 0.015), the mean number of 
sub-periods rises with  h, as expected.  But for  d = 0.020  and  0.025,  there is a tendency for the 
opposite to occur.  For  d = 0.030,  the number of sub-periods increases with  h,  as before.  This 
interaction between  h  and  d  is unexpected.  Third, the first four entries in column 2 and the 
middle two entries in column 3 show that when  h  and  d  are both small, the number of sub-periods 
can be correctly identified with high probability.  The results are further elaborated in Figure 2 
which provides the underlying distributions of the optimal number of sub-periods; the 
corresponding entries in Table 6 are the means and standard deviations of these distributions.  As a 
final way of illustrating the results, in panel A of Figure 3 we plot the probability of correctly 
identifying the true number of sub-periods against  h  and  d.  This shows that this probability never 
falls as  h  falls; and that except for a relatively minor region labelled ABCDE, the probability also 
never falls as  d  falls.  Panel B presents this region in the (d, h) plane; as this region is about 7 
percent of the (d, h) space displayed in Panel B, clearly there is no substantial problem. 
As the criterion seems to work satisfactorily, we now apply it to identify optimal sub-periods 
for the REER index using the Australian data for the period of 1970Q1-2002Q2.
10  As the weights 
span over 129 quarters, it seems not unreasonable to divide the whole period into 5 to 6 sub-periods.  
We shall use the procedure to identify the starting and ending points of each of these sub-periods by 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 1 for details of the data.  The RBA uses four sets of weights to calculate four versions of its REER 
index -- exports, imports, trade (exports plus imports) and G7-GDP.  From this point on, we will present in the text the 
results for trade weights; those pertaining to the other three sets of weights are contained in Appendixes 2 to 5.    18
FIGURE 2 
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMBER OF SUB-PERIODS, SIMULATION RESULTS 
 













































































































































































































































































































Note:  The lightly-shaded columns correspond to the true number of sub-periods, 6.  
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FIGURE 3  
IDENTIFYING THE CORRECT NUMBER OF SUB-PERIODS 














a trial-and-error approach to determine the value of the only unknown parameter d.  It can be 
seen from the second row of Table 7 that the procedure yields 6 sub-periods when   018 . 0 d = .  
Accordingly, we shall use the sub-periods identified by that row.   




























Time line  
(Observation numbers of the start of each sub-period) 
                                  
1.  0.015  9  1     20  26     52 55    68 72 76       117    
                                  
2.  0.018  6  1     20       52 55      76       117    
                                  
3.  0.020  5  1           52 55      76       117    
                                  
4.  0.025  4  1           52       76       117    
                                  
5.  0.003  2  1                         117    
                                  
Note:   The whole period is from 1970Q1 (observation number 1) to 2002Q2 (observation number 130). 
 
6.   Implementation of the Index 
 
We estimate model (3.1) with quarterly Australian data of real exchange rates for 26 
countries over the period 1970Q1-2002Q2.  Consumer prices are used to transform nominal into 
real exchange rates. Before estimation, we divide the whole sample period into optimal sub-periods 
using the criterion described in Section 5.  Based on the Monte Carlo evidence in Section 4, we use 
the HC2 version of covariance matrix (4.2) to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
The preliminary estimation results are contained in Appendix 3.  There are two points to note 
from these results: (i) Regarding the estimated changes in the REER index, the   t α   estimates, 
about 40 percent are significant at the 5 percent level.  (ii) While most of the country-specific 
components,   c β ,  are insignificant, it seems that high-growth countries tend to have negative 
estimates of   c β   and vice versa.  As discussed in Section 3, the value of   c β   could reflect the 
longer-term developments of productivity and income in country c.  To explore the relationship 
between exchange-rate changes and income growth, in Appendix 4 we adopt the methodology of 
Divisia moments. The evidence generally supports the productivity-bias hypothesis that fast (slow) 
growing countries tend to have appreciating (depreciating) currencies.  When country  c’s  currency 
appreciates (depreciates) relative to the average of all exchange-rate changes, then its   c β   is 
negative (positive).  We thus group countries according to the combination of exchange-rate and 
income changes as follows.  Let  
n
c1 tc c t DR w Dr = =∑   be the Divisia (or weighted) mean of the  n  
exchange-rate changes, so that   ct ct t Dr Dr DR ′ = −   is the relative change in the exchange rate of 
country c.  Furthermore, let   ct Dy   be the log-change in real GDP for  c,  
n
c1 tc c t DY w Dy = =∑   be the  
 21
Divisia mean growth rate and   ct ct t Dy Dy DY ′ = −   be the growth in  c  relative to the mean.  We 
then classify countries into three groups: 
  (i)  Fast growing countries with appreciating currencies:  ct Dy 0 ′ > ,   ct Dr 0 ′ < ; 
(6.1)  (ii)  Slow growing countries with depreciating currencies:  ct Dy 0 ′ < ,  ct Dr 0 ′ > ;   
 (iii)  Other:    ct Dy 0 ′ < ,  ct Dr 0 ′ < ;  or   ct Dy 0 ′ > ,  ct Dr 0 ′ > . 
For the reasons discussed above, we expect the bulk of countries to be contained in groups (i) and 
(ii). 
To reduce the number of unknown   c β ,  we assume that each country in a given group 
possesses the same   c β ,  to be denoted by   F β ,   S β   and   O β  (Ff a s t = , Ss l o w = ,  Oo t h e r = ).  We 
can then rewrite model (3.1) as   
 
(6.2)  ct t F Fct S Sct O Oct ct Dr D D D =α +β +β +β +ε  , 
 
where   Fct D,    Sct D,    Oct D   are dummy variables with   Fct D1 =   for fast-growing countries with 
appreciating currencies, 0 otherwise;  Sct D1 =  for slow-growing countries with depreciating 
currencies, 0 otherwise; and   Oct Fct Sct D1 D D = −−.  Note that the identification constraint   
n
c1 cc w0 = β= ∑   becomes   FF SS OO www0 β+ β+ β=,  where   F w ,   S w   and   O w   are the respective 
shares of the three groups of countries.  We proceed in exactly the same way as before to estimate 
(6.2) by weighting by   c w   and then computing heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
using  2 HC .  Columns 5 and 10 of Table 8 contain the estimated   t α   and Figure 4 gives histograms 
of these estimates and their t-values. 
To visualise the stochastic REER, we present in Figure 5 a “fan chart” of the changes,
11 
which plots the point estimates together with  k ±  standard-error bands, where  k 0 . 5 ,1 ,1 . 5 =  and 2.  
The bands for the late 1970s and early 1980s are quite wide, reflecting the higher variability of the 
component real exchange rates associated with high oil prices, high and variable inflation and a 
volatile world economy during that period. 
From the estimates of   t α ,  we can compute the corresponding stochastic index in levels  
as follows.  Denote the level of the index in the reference quarter by   r R ,  whose value is set to  
100.  Then for subsequent quarters,  r1 r r1 log(R /R ) + + = α   and   r2 r1 r2 log(R /R ) + ++ =α ,  …,  etc.  
By successive substitution we obtain the logarithmic index for  M  quarters after  r  as
                                                 
11 The fan chart was invented by the Band of England for reporting its probability forecasts of inflation and output 
growth (Britton et al., 1998, Wallis, 1999).    
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TABLE 8  
THE REER INDEX 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 REER  index    REER  index  Observation 
number   Year Quarter Level Change  t α
Observation 
number  Year Quarter Level  Change  t α
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 
1  1970 (1) 150.46  (7.58)  49  1982 (1) 139.63  (5.95)  -1.59 (1.04) 
2   (2)  149.72  (7.61)  -0.50 (0.45)  50   (2)  138.90  (5.94)  -0.53 (1.06) 
3   (3)  148.66  (7.66)  -0.71 (0.37)  51   (3)  136.01  (5.96)  -2.10 (1.48) 
4   (4)  148.32  (7.67)  -0.23 (0.34)  52   (4)  134.67  (6.01)  -1.00 (0.46) 
5 1971  (1)  147.80  (7.69)  -0.35 (0.40) 53 1983 (1)  132.06  (5.96)  -1.95 (1.93) 
6   (2)  147.41  (7.71)  -0.27 (0.44)  54   (2)  125.01  (6.28)  -5.48 (0.47) 
7   (3)  148.17  (7.66)  0.51 (0.33)  55   (3)  129.62  (6.00)  3.62 (1.12) 
8   (4)  150.16  (7.54)  1.34 (0.83)  56   (4)  134.26  (5.77)  3.52 (0.63) 
9 1972  (1)  147.68  (7.62)  -1.67 (1.27) 57 1984 (1)  137.76  (5.61)  2.57 (0.44) 
10   (2)  146.64  (7.68)  -0.70 (0.20)  58   (2)  134.29  (5.75)  -2.55 (0.33) 
11   (3)  148.12  (7.58)  1.00 (0.73)  59   (3)  130.97  (5.69)  -2.50 (2.03) 
12   (4)  148.77  (7.55)  0.44 (0.27)  60   (4)  135.06  (5.48)  3.08 (0.86) 
13 1973  (1)  162.61  (6.86)  8.89 (1.30) 61  1985 (1) 125.06  (5.79)  -7.70 (1.55) 
14   (2)  164.94  (6.71)  1.42 (1.51)  62   (2)  110.10  (6.50)  -12.74 (1.08) 
15   (3)  166.35  (6.62)  0.85 (0.95)  63   (3)  112.80  (6.27)  2.42 (1.09) 
16   (4)  176.77  (6.22)  6.08 (0.68)  64   (4)  105.86  (6.35)  -6.35 (2.22) 
17 1974  (1)  179.99  (6.10)  1.81 (0.65) 65 1986 (1)  105.89  (6.19)  0.03 (1.51) 
18   (2)  174.87  (6.24)  -2.89 (1.15)  66   (2)  104.75  (6.07)  -1.09 (1.56) 
19   (3)  180.15  (6.00)  2.98 (1.48)  67   (3)  90.27  (6.88)  -14.87 (1.36) 
20   (4)  160.70  (6.72)  -11.43 (0.53) 68   (4)  97.05  (6.04)  7.23 (2.07) 
21 1975  (1)  163.74  (6.56)  1.87 (1.07) 69 1987 (1) 98.41  (5.87)  1.40 (0.96) 
22   (2)  164.73  (6.52)  0.60 (0.52)  70   (2)  102.29  (5.57)  3.86 (0.98) 
23   (3)  162.28  (6.57)  -1.50 (1.21)  71   (3)  103.86  (5.34)  1.53 (1.29) 
24   (4)  167.44  (6.36)  3.13 (0.54)  72   (4)  98.76  (5.52)  -5.03 (1.02) 
25 1976  (1)  168.42  (6.32)  0.58 (0.38) 73 1988 (1) 99.76  (5.44)  1.00 (0.51) 
26   (2)  167.96  (6.30)  -0.27 (1.12)  74   (2)  107.76  (5.02)  7.72 (0.48) 
27   (3)  169.16  (6.25)  0.71 (0.64)  75   (3)  116.78  (4.34)  8.04 (1.89) 
28   (4)  158.50  (6.66)  -6.51 (0.51)  76   (4)  120.17  (4.12)  2.86 (1.09) 
29 1977 (1)  148.60  (7.08)  -6.45 (0.86)  77 1989 (1)  124.19  (3.92)  3.29 (0.87) 
30   (2)  148.71  (7.04)  0.08 (0.96) 78   (2)  117.47  (4.04)  -5.56 (1.08) 
31   (3)  147.11  (7.11)  -1.08 (0.60) 79   (3)  116.98  (4.01)  -0.42 (0.76) 
32   (4)  145.67  (7.10)  -0.99 (1.53) 80   (4)  119.80  (3.89)  2.38 (0.48) 
33 1978 (1)  143.37  (7.19)  -1.59 (0.95)  81 1990 (1)  117.68  (3.83)  -1.79 (1.21) 
34   (2)  140.08  (7.26)  -2.32 (1.68) 82   (2)  119.66  (3.67)  1.67 (1.02) 
35   (3)  135.07  (7.31)  -3.64 (2.43) 83   (3)  121.55  (3.50)  1.57 (1.08) 
36   (4)  133.65  (7.38)  -1.06 (0.51)  84   (4)  113.34  (3.31)  -7.00 (1.99) 
37 1979 (1)  133.01  (7.30)  -0.48 (1.68)  85 1991 (1)  113.93  (3.26)  0.52 (0.59) 
38   (2)  132.53  (7.19)  -0.36 (1.91)  86   (2)  116.96  (3.05)  2.62 (1.01) 
39   (3)  132.30  (7.12)  -0.18 (1.43)  87   (3)  119.19  (2.97)  1.89 (0.42) 
40   (4)  131.87  (6.95)  -0.32 (2.19)  88   (4)  115.53  (2.91)  -3.12 (1.11) 
41 1980 (1)  130.60  (6.96)  -0.97 (1.11)  89 1992 (1)  110.60  (3.01)  -4.36 (0.48) 
42   (2)  130.35  (6.91)  -0.19 (1.19)  90   (2)  111.57  (2.91)  0.88 (0.73) 
43   (3)  131.58  (6.80)  0.94 (1.07)  91   (3)  104.46  (3.01)  -6.59 (0.82) 
44   (4)  132.03  (6.73)  0.34 (1.06)  92   (4)  102.05  (2.62)  -2.33 (1.65) 
45 1981 (1)  134.68  (6.56)  1.99 (0.91)  93 1993 (1)  101.95  (2.44)  -0.09 (0.98) 
46   (2)  137.77  (6.29)  2.27 (1.72) 94   (2)  99.80  (1.64)  -2.14 (1.87) 
47   (3)  144.03  (5.84)  4.44 (2.09) 95   (3)  95.95  (1.32)  -3.93 (1.03) 
48   (4)  141.87  (5.91)  -1.51 (0.79) 96   (4)  96.50  (1.22)  0.57 (0.49) 
                  (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
THE REER INDEX 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
  REER index  REER index  Observation 
number  
Year Quarter




Level Change  t α
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
97  1994 (1) 101.86  (1.11) 5.41 (0.32)  114    (2) 100.95  (5.16) -5.17 (1.66)
98   (2)  101.71  (0.77)  -0.15 (0.81) 115   (3)  97.55  (5.04)  -3.43 (0.78)
99   (3)  101.01  (0.49)  -0.69 (0.61) 116   (4)  95.41  (5.58)  -2.22 (2.74)
100    (4)  102.38 (0.35)  1.35 (0.34)  117  1999 (1)  99.25 (6.18)  3.95 (2.14)
101  1995 (1) 100.00  (0.00) -2.35 (0.35) 118    (2) 104.27  (6.53)  4.93 (0.63)
102   (2)  92.60  (2.10)  -7.69 (2.27) 119   (3)  103.32  (6.59)  -0.91 (1.21)
103   (3)  97.74  (3.07)  5.41 (2.16) 120   (4)  100.80  (6.62)  -2.47 (1.56)
104    (4) 100.96  (3.49)  3.24 (1.47) 121  2000 (1) 100.44  (6.63) -0.36 (0.70)
105  1996  (1)  103.42 (3.73)  2.41 (1.01) 122    (2)  95.19 (6.33)  -5.36 (0.75)
106   (2)  108.79  (3.95)  5.06 (0.39) 123   (3)  94.65  (6.31)  -0.58 (0.53)
107   (3)  108.60  (3.97)  -0.18 (0.45) 124   (4)  90.00  (6.03)  -5.03 (0.59)
108    (4)  110.36 (4.13)  1.61 (0.80) 125  2001 (1)  91.16 (6.32)  1.28 (1.79)
109  1997  (1)  112.33 (4.48)  1.77 (1.38) 126    (2)  90.75 (6.31)  -0.46 (0.54)
110   (2)  110.74  (4.52)  -1.43 (0.85) 127   (3)  90.76  (6.32)  0.01 (0.41)
111   (3)  107.35  (4.50)  -3.10 (0.99) 128   (4)  91.33  (6.37)  0.63 (0.40)
112    (4)  105.64 (4.76)  -1.61 (1.65) 129  2002 (1)  94.52 (6.68)  3.43 (1.12)
113  1998  (1)  106.30 (5.14)  0.62 (1.75) 130    (2)  97.61 (6.96)  3.22 (0.95)
  Mean   -0.34  
 Percentage  of  t α  significant at the 5 % level    45  




HISTOGRAMS OF ESTIMATED   t α   AND t-RATIOS 




























mr1 rM r m logR logR +
=+ + =+ α ∑ , so that   ( )
rM
mr1 rM m R 100 exp +
=+ + = ×α ∑ ,  where  M 0 > .  
Similarly, for periods prior to the reference quarter, the level of the index number is 
( )
r
mrM1 rM m R 100 exp =+ + + =α ∑ ,  where  M0 < .  The results are presented in columns 4 and 9 of  
Mean = -.34 
SD = 3.76 Mean = -.22 
SD = 4.79  
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FIGURE 5 












Table 8.  The index   rM R +   is a nonlinear function of  M  terms of the estimated   t α , which we 
write as   rM f( ) + α ,  where   rM + α   is the relevant sub-set of the   t estimates α − .  We use the delta 
method to compute its asymptotic variance,  ( ) ( ) ( ) rM var R f f + ′ = ∂∂ ∂∂ α αΣ α,  where   α Σ   is the 
estimated MM ×  covariance matrix corresponding to  rM + α .  Figure 6 plots in fan-chart format the 
levels of the index and the confidence bands.  As can be seen, as the index value is set to 100 for 
1995Q1, there is no uncertainty for this value, and as we get further away from this base period, the 
confidence bands tend to become successively wider, reflecting the cumulative estimation error. 
Table 9 contains the country-specific estimates for the three groups of countries.  It can be 
seen that the estimated   c β   for fast-growing countries with appreciating currencies are all negative, 
while those for slow-growing countries with depreciating currencies are all positive, as expected.  
More than half of these estimates are significant.  The last row shows that the   c estimates β−  for 
the “other” group of countries are all insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Log-changes × 100  
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FIGURE 6 











1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 
 
TABLE 9  
ESTIMATES OF COUNTRY-GROUP COMPONENTS OF REER CHANGES  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 




rate  change  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Mean 
Fast Appreciation  -0.87(0.24) -0.12(0.46) -0.35(0.89) -1.19(0.45) -0.37(0.28) -0.81(0.34)  -0.65(0.15)
Slow Depreciation  0.92(0.22) 0.46(0.29) 1.67(0.92) 0.98(0.41) 0.24(0.28) 0.63(0.28)  0.70(0.13)
All other  -0.57(0.37) -0.08(0.20) -0.40(0.26) 0.04(0.34) -0.12(0.18) -0.18(0.37)  -0.20(0.11)
Notes:  1.  See Table 7 for the sub-periods. 
  2.  The means of   c β   in the last column are defined as   6
i1 ci c i c w = β =β ∑ , where the weight 
() ic ic w1 / S E / k  =β    in which   ( )
6
i1 ic k1 / S E = =β   ∑   .  Assuming independence, the standard error of  c β  is 
thus   ()
2 2 6
i1 ic ic wS E =  β ∑   
2 6/k 6/k == ,  where k is as above. 
 
7.   How Has Competitiveness Changed? 
 
In Section 2, we showed how to employ the information on the variability of individual real 
exchange rates to gauge the significance of changes in international competitiveness.  In this section 
we apply this approach to illustrate how the indexes of Section 6 can be used to assess changes in 
competitiveness between any two periods.  To provide the appropriate background for this analysis, 
Index 
(1995 = 100)  
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we start with a discussion of the broad trends in competitiveness over the past three decades and 
introduce a simple decomposition.  
Let  t P  be the price level at home at time t,  t S  be the effective nominal exchange rate and  
*
t P  be an index of foreign prices.
12  We can then write the level of the real effective exchange  
rate as  () ()
**
tt t t t t t RP S P 1 S P P == ×, which provides a decomposition of the real rate into a   
term involving the nominal rate ( ) t 1S , and a relative price term ( )
*
tt PP .  Figure 7 uses this 
decomposition for Australia and reveals several interesting features.  First, there has been a 
substantial real depreciation of the Australian dollar over the last three decades, with most of the 
change taking place between 1975 and 1985.  Second, changes in the real rate closely mirror those 
of the nominal rate, although  R  is a bit less volatile than  1S.  Third, there is a long-term upward 
trend in relative prices 
* PP, a trend which is more pronounced in the first 15 years of the period.  
Fourth, the volatility of relative prices is substantially lower than that of the two exchange rates.   
To explore these issues in more depth, consider the logarithmic change in the real rate   
 
(7.1)  ( ) ( )
*
tt t t DR D 1 S D P P =+ , 
 
where, as before, D is the log-change operator, defined for any positive variable  x  as 
( ) tt t 1 t t 1 Dx logx logx log x x −− =− = .  We define the change in the effective nominal rate as   
 
FIGURE 7 
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a trade-weighted average of the changes in the  n  nominal rates, 
n
c1 tc c t c DS w Ds  , where  w = ∑ =  is 
the trade share for county  c.  Similarly, the change in relative prices is the excess of the change in 
the CPI in Australian over a trade-weighted average of the changes in the CPIs in each of the  n   
trading partners; that is,  ( )
** n
c1 tt t cc t DP P D P wD P = ∑ =− .  A useful property of log-changes is that 
they are additive in the following sense.  If  1T x  and x  are the values of the variable  x  at the 
beginning and end of some period, then the log-change over the entire period is  ( ) T1 log x x , which 
is equal to the sum of the corresponding one-period changes over the same period; that is, 
( ) ( )
TT
t2 t2 T1 tt 1 t log x x log x x Dx == − ∑∑ == .
13  Percentage changes do not share this attractive 
additive feature.  We apply equation (7.1) to the Australian data with  n 26 =   and then accumulate 
the quarterly changes to (mostly) five-year intervals.  The results are contained in Table 10 and 
several comments can be made.
14  First, as can be seen from the second last entry of column 2, over 
the entire 33-year period the log-change in the real exchange rate is –0.43, which is equivalent to a 
depreciation of 35 percent.
15  This is composed of a cumulative depreciation of the corresponding 
nominal rate of 53 percent (column 3), while domestic inflation was 37 percent above that in the  
 
TABLE 10  
A DECOMPOSITION OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
(Log-changes × 100) 







* P/P  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1970-1975 10.69  5.16  5.53 
1976-1980 -23.76  -21.25  -2.51 
1981-1985 -22.09  -36.95  14.86 
1986-1990 6.83  -9.95  16.77 
1991-1995 -11.57  -7.84  -3.74 
1996-2000 -11.49  -10.19  -1.30 
2001-2002  8.12 6.29 1.83 
Sum -43.27 -74.72  31.44 
Mean (quarterly)  -0.34  -0.58  0.24 
                                                 
13 To construct the levels versions of  R, 1S and 
* PP for Australia in Figure 7 with  n2 6 = , we accumulate the 
quarterly changes, exponentiate and then set 1995Q1 =100. 
14 To avoid rounding errors and ensure that equation (7.1) holds exactly, we define the change in relative prices 
residually, so that  () ( )
*
tt t t DP P D R D1 S =− . 
15 The relationship between the log-change α and the implied percentage change β  is  ( ) { } exp 1 100  percent. α− × = β   
Application of this rule to the cumulative change in the real rate yields  ( ) { } exp 0.4327 1 100 35 percent. −− × = −   
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trading partners on average (column 4).
16  Second,  there is considerable variability of the real 
exchange rate, with it appreciating in three sub-periods and depreciating in the other four.  Third, in 
all sub periods except one, the real and nominal rates move in the same direction, and by the same 
order of magnitude.  Finally, in the majority of sub-periods domestic inflation was not too different 
to that in the rest of the world; in the 1980s, however, Australian inflation was substantially higher, 
so much so that this decade accounts for almost all of the cumulative inflation difference over the 
entire three decades:  The cumulative log-change in 
*
tt P P over the 1980s is 14.86 + 16.77 = 31.63, 
while that for the three decades is 31.44 (all  100) × . 
Next, we assess whether the real depreciation over the whole period of 35 percent leads to an 
improvement in Australia’s international competitiveness that is significant in statistical sense, 
using the standard errors of the index reported in the previous section.  Columns 3 and 4 of the first 
row of Table 11 give the estimates of the index numbers for 1970 and 2002.  As can be seen from 
column 5, the index falls by 53 points.  The test of the change in competitiveness involves a 
comparison of two unknown population means   0 R   and   1 R .  If we wish to test the hypothesis that 
the country’s competitiveness improved over the transition from period  0  to period  1, then the null 
is  10 RR 0 −= , while the alternative is   10 RR 0 − < .  Using a circumflex to denote an estimated 
mean and SE for the corresponding standard error, under normality the test statistic   
( ) ( ) 10
22
10 R R ˆˆ R R SE SE −+   follows a t distribution with 25 degrees of freedom.  Using the data 
given in columns 3 and 4 of row 1 of Table 11, the value of this test statistic is  -5.20,  as indicated 
in column 6.  As this is greater than (in absolute value) the 5-percent critical value of  -1.71  (using 
a one-tailed test), we are able to reject the hypothesis and conclude that international 
competitiveness improved between 1970 and 2002. 
In 1997 the nominal value of the Australian dollar reached almost 80 US cents, while by 
2001, it had depreciated to near 50 US cents.  This deprecation occurred not only vis-à-vis the US 
dollar, but also relative to the currencies of many of Australia’s other trading partners.  Did this 
nominal depreciation translate into a real depreciation so that competitiveness was enhanced, or was 
it just offset by changes in price levels?  If competitiveness improved, was the improvement 
significant?  We shall examine this issue as a second illustration of the general approach.  Applying 
the same t test as above, we can see from row 2 of Table 11 that the index fell by 18 points over this 
period, and the t-value is -2.33.  As this exceeds (in absolute value) the 5 percent critical value, we 
can reject the hypothesis of constant competitiveness from 1997 to 2001.   
                                                 
16 That is,  () { } ( ) { } exp 0.7472 1 100 53 percent; and  exp 0.3144 1 100 37 percent. − − ×= − − ×=   
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TABLE 11 
TESTS OF CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
Period  REER index for  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 0  1  0 R   1 R  
Change in  
competitiveness 
10 RR −  
t statistic for testing  
0 H :  10 RR 0 −=    
against  1 H :   10 RR0 −<  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1. 1970  2002  149.3  (7.6) 96.1 (6.8)  -53.2  -5.20 
2. 1997  2001  109.0  (4.6) 91.0 (6.2)  -18.0  -2.33 
Note:   The numbers in columns 3 to 4 are the averages over the corresponding four quarters of the index 
numbers and the associated standard errors given in columns 4 and 9 of Table 8.  
 
 
The material in this section demonstrates how the uncertainty measures of the real exchange 
rate index can be used to test for changes in international competitiveness, so that it is possible to 
analyse whether such changes are significant in statistical sense.  This is one of the attractions of the 
stochastic approach to index numbers.   
 
8.   Concluding Comments 
 
Official agencies in many countries now publish indexes of international competitiveness.  
Typically these take the form of a weighted average (of some type or other) of the real exchange 
rates between the country in question and its major trading partners.  An important aspect of these 
indexes that has been neglected is that as they are an average of the underlying real exchange rates, 
they are subject to estimation uncertainty, except in the unlikely case in which all the real rates 
change equiproportionally.  Accordingly, these indexes convey a false sense of accuracy as they 
ignore the volatility of the component real rates. 
The recently-revived stochastic approach to index-number theory can be employed to solve 
this defect in current practice by providing the whole probability distribution of the index of 
international competitiveness, with the dispersion of the distribution reflecting the volatility of real 
rates.  A stochastic index of international competitiveness can be thought of as representing the 
solution to a signal-extraction problem: The  n  real exchange rates (n  being the number of trading 
partners) are each made up of two components, the signal and noise, and the problem is to combine 
the real rates in such a manner so as to minimise the overall impact of noise in the system.  This 
leads to the index emerging as the generalised least-squares (GLS) estimator of the common trend 
in the  n  real rates, so that the index has a number of attractive properties associated with GLS 
theory.  The econometric framework provides not only a point estimate of the index, but also its  
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standard error, which can be used to assess the confidence that can be placed in the estimate of 
international competitiveness. 
In this paper we demonstrated the implementation of the stochastic approach to the 
measurement of international competitiveness.  The application with Australian data contained 
several novel features including Monte Carlo simulation results on the modelling of 
heteroscedasticity in the context of the stochastic approach; the introduction of a procedure for 
determining the length of sub-periods during which the country weights of the index can be treated 
as remaining unchanged; the use of a “fan type” diagram to provide a new way to visualise 
stochastic index numbers, with colour-coded probabilities; and the use of the productivity-bias 
hypothesis of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) as a way to link the evolution of real exchange 
rates to country income.   
One final point is worth making.  The stochastic approach requires no more data than is 
currently employed in conventional competitiveness indexes.  In a fundamental sense, conventional 
indexes are concerned with the first moment of the data, while stochastic indexes use both first and 
second moments, so that the volatility of the underlying data leads directly to estimation uncertainty 
as measured by the standard error of the index.  
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APPENDIX 1 
THE RBA INDEX 
 
  The Reserve Bank of Australia publishes a quarterly real exchange rate index.  There 
are four versions of this index, each corresponding to a different set of weights, exports, 
imports, trade (exports plus imports) and G7-GDP.  Let   c w   be the weight for country  c  
(c 1, ..., n) =   and   ct r   be the real exchange rate between  c  and Australia in quarter  t.  The 
Bank defines its multilateral index as a weighted geometric mean of the  n  bilateral rates, the 






wl o g r
= ∑  . 
 
The weights are held constant for certain sub-periods and then change in a discrete fashion.  
When the weights change, the RBA slices the index (Ellis, 2001).
17 
To evaluate the RBA index (A1.1), we obtained the nominal exchange rates and CPIs 
from Datastream, and Luci Ellis of the RBA generously provided us with the country 
weights.
18  Figure A1 gives the indexes published by the RBA, as well as our “reproduced” 
versions. As can be seen, we reproduce the Bank’s results reasonably closely.  These indexes 
show that the Australia dollar has depreciated in real terms over the last three decades by 
something of the order of 30 percent.   
 
                                                 
17 Splicing is carried out as follows.  Assume that at time   0 1 t t >   the weights change to  
1 t , c w   from their 
previous values at time   0 t,   
0 t , c w .  Then the spliced index at time   1 t   is given by 
101 1 1 0 cc t t c,t c,t c,t c,t logR log R w logr w logr =+ − ∑∑ . 
18 The RBA trade weights originally included 29 countries, which represent 90 percent of Australia’s 
international trade.  In our initial explorations, it was found that the data on China, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
severely distorted the real exchange rate index.  Thus we set the trade weights for these three countries to zero 
and renormalise the remaining weights to sum to one.  The import and export weights use the same 26 countries 




FOUR REAL EXCHANGE INDEXES 
(1995Q1 = 100) 





























































































































































OPTIMAL SUB-PERIODS FOR  
THE FOUR SETS OF WEIGHTS 
 
 
To be consistent with the RBA approach, we use the same four sets of weights in the 
stochastic approach: trade, import, export and G7-GDP.  Before estimation, we use the 
criterion described in Section 5 to divide the whole sample period into optimal sub-periods 
during which the weights are assumed to be constant.   
For the first three sets of weights quarterly data are available, while for G7-GDP we 
only have annual data for 1980-2001.  We “expand” the 22 annual GDP weights for each 
country into 88 quarterly weights by assuming that they are constant within each year.  The 
trade, import and export weights refer to 129 quarters and we divide the whole period into 5 
to 6 sub-periods.  As the total number of quarters is smaller for GDP weights (88), it is not 
unreasonable to use 3 to 4 sub-periods in this case.  We use the procedure of Section 5 to 
identify the optimal sub-periods for each of the four weighting schemes.  The optimal sub-
periods are displayed in rows 2, 7, 11 and 16 of Table A1. 
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TABLE A1  






Time line  
(Observation numbers of the start of each sub-period) 
 
A. Trade weights 
                                      
1.  0.015  9  1       20  26       52  55     68  72  76          117    
                                      
2.  0 . 0 1 8   6   1        2 0         5 2   5 5        7 6           1 1 7     
                                      
3.  0 . 0 2 0   5   1               5 2   5 5        7 6           1 1 7     
                                      
4.  0 . 0 2 5   4   1               5 2         7 6           1 1 7     
                                      
5.  0 . 0 0 3   2   1                               1 1 7     
                                      
B. Import weights 
                                      
6.  0.017  8  1       20        52  55      72   84       108  117    
                                      
7.  0 . 0 1 8   5   1        2 0         5 2   5 5                 1 1 7     
                                      
8.  0 . 0 2 0   3   1        2 0                         1 1 7     
                                      
9.  0 . 0 2 2   2   1                               1 1 7     
                                      
C. Export weights 
                                      
10.  0.016  9  1        26     39   52  55     68  72  76          117    
                                      
11.  0.018  6  1        26       52      68  72           117    
                                      
12.  0 . 0 2 0   5   1         2 6        5 2        7 2            1 1 7     
                                      
13.  0 . 0 2 4   4   1               5 2        7 2            1 1 7     
                                      
14.  0 . 0 3 0   2   1                     7 2               
                                      
D. G7-GDP weights 
                                      
15.  . 0 0 4 0   6             4 1    4 9     5 7          8 5       1 1 3 1 1 7     
                                      
16.  . 0 0 5 0   4             4 1    4 9     5 7               1 1 3    
                                      
Note:   1.  This table corresponds to Table 7. 
  2.  The whole period is from 1970Q1 (observation number 1) to 2002Q2 (observation number 130).    
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APPENDIX 3 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF MODEL (3.1) 
FOR FOUR SETS OF WEIGHTS 
 
This appendix presents the preliminary estimation results of equation (3.1), with the 
country-specific components   c β   satisfying the identification constraint   c cc w0 β= ∑ .  These 
results are preliminary in that the country-specific parameters are otherwise unconstrained.  Table 
A2 contains the preliminary estimates of the REER with the four sets of weights.  It can be seen that 
with the trade weights, the point estimates are exactly the same as the final estimates reported in 
Table 8, where the countries are categorised into three groups.  This is due to the orthogonality 
between the time component   t α   and the country/group component   c β   in model (3.1).  The four 
versions of indexes in levels are quite similar.  Figures A2 and A3 give the histograms of the 
estimates and their t-values.  The fan charts for changes and levels of the REER index are given in 
Figures A4 and A5. 
The preliminary estimates of the country-specific parameters,   c β ,  are contained in Table 
A3 and we can see that most of them are insignificant.  Figure A6 plots   c β   for each country and it 
can be seen that they tend to fluctuate considerably over time.  Next to eliminate some detail, we 
plot in Figure A7 the estimated   c β   averaged over sub-periods (these averages are given in the last 
column of Table A3).  As can be seen, the mean for Japan is consistently significantly negative, 






PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights  
Trade   Import   Export   G7-GDP  
Observation 
number   Year Quarter 
Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
1  1970  (1)  150.46 (17.47)    146.63 (17.94)    162.08 (11.80)        
2   (2)  149.72  (17.44)  -0.50 (0.75)  145.83  (17.92) -0.54 (0.74)  161.40  (11.79) -0.42 (0.55)       
3   (3)  148.66  (17.45)  -0.71 (0.76)  144.78  (17.94) -0.72 (0.74)  160.27  (11.81) -0.70 (0.60)       
4   (4)  148.32  (17.39)  -0.23 (0.70)  144.51  (17.87) -0.19 (0.69)  159.81  (11.79) -0.29 (0.49)       
5 1971  (1)  147.80  (17.36)  -0.35 (0.83)  143.87  (17.85) -0.44 (0.83)  159.28  (11.79) -0.33 (0.64)       
6   (2)  147.41  (17.33)  -0.27 (0.85)  143.21  (17.86) -0.46 (0.90)  158.92  (11.77) -0.22 (0.59)       
7   (3)  148.17  (17.18)  0.51 (0.86)  143.84  (17.71) 0.44 (0.87)  159.54  (11.69) 0.39 (0.61)       
8   (4)  150.16  (16.91)  1.34 (1.21)  146.09  (17.39) 1.56 (1.13)  160.88  (11.57) 0.83 (1.04)       
9 1972  (1)  147.68  (17.17)  -1.67 (1.58)  144.13  (17.61) -1.35 (1.46)  157.22  (11.83) -2.30 (1.40)       
10   (2)  146.64  (17.24)  -0.70 (0.77)  143.17  (17.66) -0.67 (0.76)  155.94  (11.90) -0.82 (0.52)       
11   (3)  148.12  (17.00)  1.00 (1.02)  145.07  (17.35) 1.32 (1.19)  156.99  (11.77) 0.67 (0.71)       
12   (4)  148.77  (16.88)  0.44 (0.73)  146.01  (17.19) 0.65 (0.73)  157.34  (11.71) 0.22 (0.49)       
13 1973  (1)  162.61  (15.42)  8.89 (1.62)  160.02  (15.67) 9.16 (1.50)  170.58  (10.79) 8.08 (1.43)       
14   (2)  164.94  (15.18)  1.42 (1.78)  162.48  (15.41) 1.53 (1.70)  171.75  (10.71) 0.68 (1.55)       
15   (3)  166.35  (15.00)  0.85 (1.40)  163.85  (15.23) 0.84 (1.60)  172.67  (10.61) 0.53 (1.28)       
16   (4)  176.77  (14.09)  6.08 (0.89)  174.82  (14.24) 6.48 (0.91)  182.93  (9.97) 5.77 (0.86)       
17 1974  (1)  179.99  (13.82)  1.81 (0.87)  178.55  (13.92) 2.11 (0.93)  185.81  (9.79) 1.56 (0.69)       
18   (2)  174.87  (14.19)  -2.89 (1.48)  173.22  (14.32) -3.03 (1.58)  180.29  (10.07) -3.02 (1.10)       
19   (3)  180.15  (13.75)  2.98 (1.46)  178.32  (13.89) 2.90 (1.25)  186.54  (9.67) 3.41 (1.58)       
20   (4)  160.70  (15.15)  -11.43 (0.79)  158.74  (15.36) -11.63 (0.74)  166.66  (10.80) -11.27 (0.73)       
21 1975  (1)  163.74  (14.65)  1.87 (1.07)  161.22  (14.92) 1.55 (1.19)  169.45  (10.59) 1.66 (1.14)       
22   (2)  164.73  (14.32)  0.60 (0.70)  162.15  (14.60) 0.57 (0.76)  170.15  (10.53) 0.41 (0.76)       
23   (3)  162.28  (14.36)  -1.50 (1.34)  160.11  (14.63) -1.27 (1.40)  168.25  (10.63) -1.12 (0.87)       
24   (4)  167.44  (13.71)  3.13 (0.84)  165.11  (13.98) 3.08 (0.83)  174.56  (10.24) 3.68 (0.52)       
25 1976  (1)  168.42  (13.40)  0.58 (0.69)  166.21  (13.67) 0.66 (0.70)  175.46  (10.18) 0.51 (0.52)       
26   (2)  167.96  (13.15)  -0.27 (1.36)  166.40  (13.37) 0.12 (1.55)  174.07  (10.04)  -0.80 (1.21)       
27   (3)  169.16  (12.83)  0.71 (0.87)  167.93  (13.03) 0.91 (0.87)  174.58  (9.83) 0.29 (0.82)       
28   (4)  158.50  (13.46)  -6.51 (0.86)  157.27  (13.67) -6.56 (1.03)  163.57  (10.31) -6.51 (0.65)       
29 1977 (1)  148.60  (14.12)  -6.45 (0.91)  147.30  (14.37) -6.55 (1.00)  153.23  (10.83) -6.53 (0.77)       
30   (2)  148.71  (13.87)  0.08 (1.05)  147.63  (14.12) 0.23 (0.94)  152.65  (10.67)  -0.38 (1.12)       
31   (3)  147.11  (13.80)  -1.08 (0.78)  146.17  (14.06) -0.99 (0.73)  150.52  (10.64) -1.41 (0.73)       
32   (4)  145.67  (13.70)  -0.99 (1.54)  145.00  (13.96) -0.80 (1.38)  147.90  (10.61) -1.76 (1.67)       
33 1978 (1)  143.37  (13.73)  -1.59 (0.96)  142.32  (14.05) -1.87 (1.07)  145.61  (10.63) -1.55 (0.71)       
34   (2)  140.08  (13.71)  -2.32 (1.83)  139.89  (13.98) -1.72 (1.75)  140.89  (10.65) -3.30 (2.04)       
35   (3)  135.07  (13.89)  -3.64 (2.42)  135.41  (14.18) -3.25 (2.10)  134.30  (10.77) -4.79 (2.79)       
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TABLE A2 (continued) 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 
Trade   Import   Export   G7-GDP  
Observation 
number   Year Quarter 
Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
36   (4)  133.65  (13.84)  -1.06 (0.78) 133.75  (14.17)  -1.24 (0.83)  133.07  (10.70) -0.92 (0.68)      
37 1979 (1)  133.01  (13.62)  -0.48 (1.87)  132.46  (14.06)  -0.97 (1.65)  133.70  (10.36) 0.47 (2.06)      
38   (2)  132.53  (13.38)  -0.36 (2.08) 131.44  (13.91)  -0.77 (1.88)  134.66  (9.98) 0.71 (2.25)      
39   (3)  132.30  (13.16)  -0.18 (1.54) 130.44  (13.78)  -0.76 (1.70)  135.41  (9.72) 0.56 (1.37)      
40   (4)  131.87  (12.91)  -0.32 (2.39) 129.46  (13.64)  -0.75 (2.09)  136.45  (9.28) 0.76 (2.70)      
41 1980 (1)  130.60  (12.86)  -0.97 (1.30)  127.84  (13.65) -1.26 (1.25)  135.95  (9.15) -0.37 (1.33)  127.38(11.95)     
42   (2)  130.35  (12.73)  -0.19 (1.29) 127.93  (13.50) 0.07 (1.19)  135.03  (9.04) -0.68 (1.52) 128.13(11.77)  0.59 (1.31) 
43   (3)  131.58  (12.52)  0.94 (1.06) 129.29  (13.28) 1.06 (1.00)  135.71  (8.91) 0.50 (1.02) 130.22(11.57)  1.62 (3.02) 
44   (4)  132.03  (12.36)  0.34 (1.23) 130.39  (13.06) 0.85 (1.28)  135.53  (8.79) -0.14 (1.30) 131.97(11.36)  1.34 (0.60) 
45 1981 (1)  134.68  (12.04)  1.99 (1.10)  133.52  (12.68) 2.37 (1.20)  137.89  (8.56) 1.73 (1.05) 135.89(11.19)  2.93 (1.22) 
46   (2)  137.77  (11.71)  2.27 (1.80) 136.58  (12.34) 2.26 (1.78)  141.79  (8.27) 2.79 (1.56) 138.62(10.73)  1.98 (3.21) 
47   (3)  144.03  (11.11)  4.44 (2.16) 143.07  (11.68) 4.64 (2.31)  148.66  (7.81) 4.73 (1.74) 143.39(10.28)  3.39 (3.32) 
48   (4)  141.87  (11.23)  -1.51 (0.88) 140.65  (11.83) -1.70 (0.99)  146.09  (7.90) -1.75 (0.70)  141.04(10.24)  -1.65 (3.26) 
49 1982 (1)  139.63  (11.35)  -1.59 (1.25)  138.25  (11.99) -1.72 (1.13)  144.55  (7.93) -1.06 (1.24)  138.45(10.39)  -1.85 (0.81) 
50   (2)  138.90  (11.37)  -0.53 (1.26) 137.29  (12.04) -0.69 (1.15)  144.52  (7.88) -0.02 (1.22)  136.96(10.45)  -1.08 (0.83) 
51   (3)  136.01  (11.55)  -2.10 (1.63) 134.30  (12.26) -2.21 (1.49)  142.34  (7.91) -1.52 (1.62)  133.73(10.67)  -2.39 (2.04) 
52   (4)  134.67  (11.32)  -1.00 (1.70) 133.13  (11.99) -0.87 (1.78)  140.54  (7.82) -1.28 (0.66)  131.75(10.31)  -1.49 (0.88) 
53 1983 (1)  132.06  (11.22)  -1.95 (2.63)  130.97  (11.83) -1.64 (2.77)  136.58  (7.82) -2.86 (1.57)  129.69(10.35)  -1.57 (3.23) 
54   (2)  125.01  (11.78)  -5.48 (1.67) 123.82  (12.43) -5.62 (1.79)  129.62  (8.05) -5.23 (0.74)  122.51(10.72)  -5.70 (0.70) 
55   (3)  129.62  (10.99)  3.62 (1.07) 128.26  (11.80) 3.52 (0.92)  134.40  (7.57) 3.62 (1.05) 126.63(10.16)  3.31 (1.31) 
56   (4)  134.26  (10.26)  3.52 (0.83) 133.19  (11.13) 3.78 (0.72)  138.59  (7.18) 3.07 (0.62) 131.60 (9.53)  3.85 (0.78) 
57 1984 (1)  137.76  (9.66)  2.57 (0.81)  136.79  (10.63) 2.66 (0.49)  141.84  (6.86) 2.32 (0.78) 135.37 (9.12)  2.83 (0.64) 
58   (2)  134.29  (9.59)  -2.55 (0.72) 133.43  (10.70) -2.48 (0.39)  138.14  (6.92) -2.64 (0.61)  132.07 (9.09)  -2.47 (0.33) 
59   (3)  130.97  (9.51)  -2.50 (1.87) 130.00  (10.82) -2.60 (1.78)  135.45  (6.86) -1.97 (1.84)  127.11 (9.12)  -3.83 (3.69) 
60   (4)  135.06  (8.92)  3.08 (0.84) 134.31  (10.28) 3.26 (0.78)  139.50  (6.55) 2.95 (0.64) 130.79 (8.60)  2.86 (1.80) 
61 1985 (1)  125.06  (9.29)  -7.70 (1.47)  124.36  (10.92) -7.70 (1.29)  129.42  (6.88) -7.50 (1.50)  120.47 (8.99)  -8.22 (3.14) 
62   (2)  110.10  (10.22)  -12.74 (1.41) 109.35  (12.16) -12.86 (1.23)  114.15  (7.67) -12.55 (1.12) 105.80 (9.93)  -12.98 (2.30) 
63   (3)  112.80  (9.73)  2.42 (1.42) 111.99  (11.68) 2.38 (1.30)  116.69  (7.36) 2.20 (1.39) 108.87 (9.61)  2.86 (2.55) 
64   (4)  105.86  (10.06)  -6.35 (2.34) 105.58  (12.11) -5.89 (2.18)  108.68  (7.59) -7.11 (2.30)  102.98 (9.98)  -5.56 (4.20) 
65 1986 (1)  105.89  (9.73)  0.03 (1.71)  105.88  (11.78) 0.28 (1.58)  108.53  (7.41) -0.14 (1.60) 102.71 (9.65) -0.27 (3.47) 
66   (2)  104.75  (9.50)  -1.09 (1.72) 105.04  (11.58) -0.80 (1.56)  106.72  (7.34) -1.68 (1.70)  102.29 (9.56)  -0.41 (2.47) 
67   (3) 90.27  (10.61)  -14.87 (1.51)  90.61  (13.04) -14.78 (1.35)  91.99  (8.34) -14.85 (1.55) 87.69(10.66)  -15.40 (2.35) 
68   (4) 97.05  (9.48)  7.23 (1.41)  96.69  (11.75) 6.49 (1.51)  99.76  (7.48) 8.10 (1.09)  92.56 (9.57)  5.40 (0.35) 
69 1987 (1)  98.41  (9.12)  1.40 (1.35) 97.92  (11.39) 1.27 (1.19)  101.15  (7.27) 1.39 (0.77)  93.96 (9.31)  1.51 (2.82) 
70   (2)  102.29  (8.56)  3.86 (1.25) 101.92  (10.70) 4.00 (1.15)  104.43  (6.86) 3.19 (1.39)  98.89 (8.75)  5.11 (1.50) 
                  (continued  on  next  page)  
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TABLE A2 (continued) 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 




Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) (11) 
71   (3)  103.86  (8.12)  1.53 (1.54)  103.31 (10.19)  1.36 (1.15)  106.14  (6.61) 1.62 (1.41) 100.78  (8.34)  1.89 (1.37) 
72   (4)  98.76  (8.38)  -5.03 (1.30)  98.35  (10.50)  -4.92 (1.21) 101.00  (6.79) -4.96 (1.12) 96.21  (8.52)  -4.64 (2.91) 
73 1988  (1)  99.76  (8.17) 1.00 (0.94)  99.46  (10.14)  1.12 (0.79) 101.52  (6.64) 0.52 (0.75) 97.88  (8.38)  1.73 (1.22) 
74   (2)  107.76  (7.48)  7.72 (0.88)  107.55  (9.12)  7.82 (0.62) 109.27  (6.07) 7.35 (0.55)  106.33 (7.55)  8.28 (0.61) 
75   (3)  116.78  (6.73)  8.04 (1.80)  116.42  (8.18)  7.93 (1.61) 118.10  (5.45) 7.77 (1.33)  114.82 (6.70)  7.69 (3.99) 
76   (4)  120.17  (6.34)  2.86 (1.02)  119.71  (7.74)  2.79 (0.95) 121.42  (5.15) 2.78 (1.07)  117.97 (6.40)  2.70 (2.17) 
77 1989  (1)  124.19  (5.96) 3.29 (0.94)  123.68  (7.25)  3.26 (0.97) 125.54  (4.85) 3.33 (1.01) 121.51  (6.00)  2.96 (1.73) 
78   (2)  117.47  (6.07)  -5.56 (1.21)  117.08  (7.34)  -5.49 (1.34) 118.78  (4.92) -5.54 (1.33)  115.05 (6.19)  -5.47 (2.42) 
79   (3)  116.98  (5.89)  -0.42 (0.89)  116.54  (7.07)  -0.46 (1.05) 118.44  (4.78) -0.29 (1.02)  114.42 (5.82)  -0.54 (0.74) 
80   (4)  119.80  (5.59)  2.38 (0.56)  119.00  (6.66)  2.09 (0.87) 121.62  (4.57) 2.65 (0.53)  116.24 (5.61)  1.57 (0.76) 
81 1990  (1)  117.68  (5.39)  -1.79 (1.29)  116.31  (6.38)  -2.28 (1.56) 120.13  (4.39) -1.24 (1.36) 112.84  (5.35)  -2.96 (0.88) 
82   (2)  119.66  (5.05)  1.67 (1.11)  117.95  (5.93)  1.40 (1.32) 122.62  (4.11) 2.05 (1.21)  113.95 (5.05)  0.98 (0.44) 
83   (3)  121.55  (4.80)  1.57 (0.99)  119.76  (5.64)  1.52 (1.15) 124.50  (3.92) 1.52 (0.93)  116.13 (4.76)  1.89 (2.47) 
84   (4)  113.34  (4.67)  -7.00 (1.91)  111.76  (5.69)  -6.91 (1.72) 115.73  (3.70) -7.30 (2.08)  108.62 (4.59)  -6.68 (3.13) 
85 1991  (1)  113.93  (4.49) 0.52 (0.72)  112.29  (5.39)  0.48 (0.88) 116.44  (3.57) 0.60 (0.73) 108.81  (4.46)  0.17 (1.54) 
86   (2)  116.96  (4.19)  2.62 (1.10)  115.82  (4.93)  3.09 (1.43) 119.04  (3.38) 2.21 (0.82)  112.72 (4.19)  3.53 (4.03) 
87   (3)  119.19  (3.96)  1.89 (0.45)  117.86  (4.63)  1.75 (0.41) 121.35  (3.24) 1.92 (0.43)  114.53 (3.95)  1.59 (0.39) 
88   (4)  115.53  (3.86)  -3.12 (1.03)  114.04  (4.55)  -3.29 (1.08) 117.70  (3.13) -3.05 (1.12)  110.71 (3.86)  -3.39 (2.58) 
89 1992  (1)  110.60  (3.88)  -4.36 (0.50)  109.06  (4.52)  -4.47 (0.50) 112.75  (3.18) -4.30 (0.50) 105.78  (3.80)  -4.56 (0.20) 
90   (2)  111.57  (3.65)  0.88 (0.72)  109.70  (4.24)  0.59 (0.68) 113.96  (3.02) 1.07 (0.76)  106.07 (3.72)  0.28 (0.19) 
91   (3)  104.46  (3.73)  -6.59 (0.74)  102.49  (4.27)  -6.80 (1.10) 106.89  (3.12) -6.41 (0.61) 98.93  (3.66)  -6.97 (2.70) 
92   (4)  102.05  (3.27)  -2.33 (1.69)  100.67  (3.70)  -1.79 (1.84) 103.76  (2.83) -2.97 (1.41) 97.58  (3.23)  -1.37 (3.64) 
93 1993  (1)  101.95  (3.00)  -0.09 (1.01)  100.74  (3.37)  0.07 (1.00) 103.31  (2.68) -0.44 (0.82) 97.59  (3.01)  0.00 (2.38) 
94   (2)  99.80  (2.26)  -2.14 (1.81)  98.83  (2.81)  -1.92 (1.61) 100.69  (1.85) -2.57 (1.93) 96.35  (2.37)  -1.28 (2.16) 
95   (3)  95.95  (1.88)  -3.93 (1.04)  95.38  (2.50)  -3.56 (0.88) 96.39  (1.54) -4.36 (1.00)  93.48  (2.07) -3.02 (1.00) 
96   (4)  96.50  (1.59)  0.57 (0.63)  95.95  (2.10)  0.60 (0.81) 96.97  (1.28) 0.61 (0.69)  94.17 (1.72)  0.73 (1.28) 
97 1994  (1)  101.86  (1.30) 5.41 (0.47)  101.43  (1.70)  5.56 (0.58) 102.28  (1.07) 5.33 (0.46) 99.84  (1.44)  5.85 (0.77) 
98   (2)  101.71  (0.95)  -0.15 (0.74)  101.41  (1.37)  -0.03 (0.77) 101.94  (0.77) -0.34 (0.70)  100.12 (1.12)  0.28 (1.50) 
99   (3)  101.01  (0.68)  -0.69 (0.55)  100.81  (0.97)  -0.59 (0.83) 101.10  (0.63) -0.82 (0.40) 99.98  (0.83)  -0.14 (1.66) 
100   (4)  102.38  (0.40)  1.35 (0.46)  102.26  (0.56)  1.42 (0.66) 102.48  (0.33) 1.35 (0.50) 101.79  (0.39)  1.80 (0.56) 
101 1995  (1)  100.00  (0.00) -2.35 (0.40) 100.00  (0.00)  -2.23 (0.57) 100.00  (0.00) -2.45 (0.34) 100.00  (0.00)  -1.78 (0.29) 
102   (2)  92.60  (2.04)  -7.69 (2.20)  93.07  (1.92)  -7.18 (2.07) 91.96  (2.09) -8.38 (2.27)  94.10  (1.97) -6.08 (2.92) 
103   (3)  97.74  (3.13)  5.41 (2.28)  97.95  (3.11)  5.11 (2.35) 97.59  (3.34) 5.95 (2.54)  98.16 (3.10)  4.22 (2.13) 
104   (4)  100.96  (3.66)  3.24 (1.58)  100.82  (3.72)  2.88 (1.72) 101.35  (3.91) 3.77 (1.72) 100.55  (3.81)  2.41 (1.42) 
105 1996  (1)  103.42  (3.99)  2.41 (1.14) 103.24  (4.14)  2.37 (1.28) 103.98  (4.26) 2.57 (1.27) 102.78  (4.13)  2.19 (1.70) 
                  (continued  on  next  page)  
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TABLE A2 (continued) 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 
Trade   Import   Export   G7-GDP  
Observation 
number   Year Quarter 
Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
106   (2)  108.79  (4.31)  5.06 (0.55)  108.75 (4.57) 5.20 (0.73)  109.32 (4.55)  5.00 (0.59)  108.46 (4.39)  5.38 (0.79) 
107   (3)  108.60  (4.44)  -0.18 (0.56)  108.35 (4.79)  -0.37 (0.78) 109.36  (4.64)  0.04 (0.61) 107.91 (4.63)  -0.51 (0.09) 
108   (4)  110.36  (4.73)  1.61 (0.91)  109.93 (5.20) 1.45 (1.12)  111.37 (4.90)  1.81 (0.96)  109.37 (4.84)  1.34 (0.86) 
109 1997  (1)  112.33  (5.17)  1.77 (1.49)  111.82 (5.79) 1.70 (1.73)  113.57 (5.34)  1.96 (1.55)  111.00 (5.49)  1.48 (3.46) 
110   (2)  110.74  (5.30)  -1.43 (0.84)  110.39 (5.96)  -1.28 (0.68) 111.71  (5.39) -1.65 (0.85) 109.83 (5.54)  -1.06 (0.56) 
111   (3)  107.35  (5.37)  -3.10 (1.00)  106.89 (6.03)  -3.23 (0.78) 108.21  (5.39) -3.18 (1.02) 105.92 (5.59)  -3.63 (1.08) 
112   (4)  105.64  (5.63)  -1.61 (1.65)  103.54 (6.27)  -3.18 (1.58) 107.88  (5.72) -0.31 (1.74) 100.04 (5.80)  -5.71 (0.55) 
113 1998  (1)  106.30  (6.00)  0.62 (1.73) 102.96 (6.50)  -0.56 (1.25)  109.54  (6.30) 1.53 (2.11)  97.57  (6.23)  -2.50 (1.14) 
114   (2)  100.95  (6.16)  -5.17 (1.78) 97.96 (6.66)  -4.98 (1.63) 104.13  (6.52) -5.07 (2.19) 92.67  (6.50) -5.15 (1.55) 
115   (3)  97.55  (6.13)  -3.43 (0.91) 94.43 (6.70)  -3.67 (1.02) 100.87  (6.45) -3.18 (1.00) 88.67  (6.47) -4.41 (1.04) 
116   (4)  95.41  (6.65)  -2.22 (2.67) 92.96 (7.12)  -1.56 (2.52) 97.83  (6.90)  -3.06 (2.79) 88.60 (6.90)  -0.08 (4.41) 
117 1999  (1) 99.25  (7.26)  3.95 (2.20)  97.05 (7.74) 4.30 (2.20)  101.41 (7.52)  3.59 (2.29)  91.19 (7.53)  2.88 (0.55) 
118   (2)  104.27  (7.71)  4.93 (0.86)  102.08 (8.25) 5.06 (1.05)  106.38 (7.95)  4.79 (0.74)  95.92 (7.91)  5.06 (1.49) 
119   (3)  103.32  (7.79)  -0.91 (1.16)  101.34 (8.36)  -0.73 (1.09) 105.17  (8.01) -1.14 (1.30) 95.19  (8.12) -0.77 (1.21) 
120   (4)  100.80  (7.85)  -2.47 (1.49) 99.22 (8.45)  -2.11 (1.39) 102.17  (8.01) -2.90 (1.64) 93.15  (8.12) -2.17 (1.80) 
121  2000 (1) 100.44  (7.96)  -0.36 (0.92)  98.98 (8.63) -0.25 (1.04) 101.67  (8.07) -0.49 (0.90) 93.22  (8.18)  0.08 (1.49) 
122   (2)  95.19  (7.67)  -5.36 (0.86) 93.97 (8.39)  -5.19 (1.05) 96.17  (7.71)  -5.56 (0.70) 88.39 (7.97)  -5.32 (1.20) 
123   (3)  94.65  (7.74)  -0.58 (0.68) 93.41 (8.52)  -0.60 (0.80) 95.64  (7.74)  -0.55 (0.63) 87.43 (8.01)  -1.10 (0.73) 
124   (4)  90.00  (7.45)  -5.03 (0.73) 88.67 (8.24)  -5.21 (0.87) 91.14  (7.43)  -4.83 (0.63) 82.35 (7.69)  -5.98 (1.05) 
125 2001  (1) 91.16  (7.98)  1.28 (2.00) 89.15 (8.83)  0.55 (2.01)  93.10 (7.92)  2.13 (2.00)  82.31 (8.18)  -0.05 (0.50) 
126   (2)  90.75  (8.05)  -0.46 (0.76) 88.67 (8.95)  -0.54 (0.95) 92.78  (7.95)  -0.34 (0.59) 81.37 (8.23)  -1.15 (1.52) 
127   (3)  90.76  (8.21)  0.01 (0.51) 88.62 (9.22)  -0.06 (0.67) 92.86  (8.04)  0.09 (0.42) 81.23 (8.55)  -0.18 (0.94) 
128   (4)  91.33  (8.42)  0.63 (0.61) 88.92 (9.53) 0.34 (0.74)  93.72  (8.19)  0.92 (0.50) 81.32  (8.61)  0.11 (0.28) 
129 2002  (1) 94.52  (8.97)  3.43 (1.36)  91.71(10.16)  3.09 (1.30)  97.36  (8.72)  3.82 (1.46)       
130   (2)  97.61  (9.44)  3.22 (0.81) 94.86(10.80)  3.38 (0.96)  100.37  (9.09)  3.04 (0.73)       
Mean   -0.34        -0.34      -0.37      -0.52  
Percentage of  t α  
 significant at the 5 % level  40     40  43 45
Note:  The entries in columns 5, 7, 9 and 11 are to be divided by 100.  
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FIGURE A2 
HISTOGRAMS OF PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF  t α   
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Note: All estimated   t α   are to be divided by 100. 
 
FIGURE A3 
HISTOGRAMS OF t-RATIOS OF PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF  t α  
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Mean = -.17 
SD = 3.62 
Mean = -.31 
SD = 4.53
Mean = -.23 
SD = 4.11 
Mean = -.19 
SD = 3.67 
Mean = -.34 
SD = 3.76
Mean = -.37 
SD = 3.79 
Mean = -.52 
SD = 4.04 
Mean = -.34 
SD = 3.76  
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FIGURE A4 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX AND CONFIDENCE BANDS: CHANGES  
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FIGURE A5 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF REER INDEX AND CONFIDENCE BANDS: LEVELS 
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TABLE A3  
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF COUNTRY COMPONENTS OF MODEL (3.1)  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Sub-period 
Country 
1 2 3 4 5 6  Mean 
A. Trade weights 
USA 1.31 (.72)  -.34 (.52)  .05(1.54)  .78 (.78)  -.36 (.73)  -.55(1.32)  .18 (.33) 
Germany -.55 (.91)  1.08 (.79)  .02(1.97)  -.17 (.86)  -.46 (.56)  .58 (.97)  .05 (.36) 
Japan -.91 (.48)  -.20 (.46)  -.43(1.32)  -1.76 (.54)  .01 (.39)  .07 (.75)  -.54 (.23) 
UK .33 (.57)  -.85 (.76)  .53(3.36)  .28 (.95)  -.59 (.63)  .01 (.56)  -.13 (.31) 
Switzerland -1.26 (.75)  -.19 (.97)  -.08(2.17)  -.64 (.66)  .22 (.88)  -.48 (.41) 
New Zealand  -.84 (.65)  .72 (.73)  .53(2.52)  -1.07 (1.34) .74 (.47)  -.06(1.04) .08 (.34) 
Hong Kong  -1.55 (.75)  .39 (.75)  .62(2.79)  1.06 (.90)  -2.04 (.54)  .17 (.68)  -.49 (.33) 
Singapore -.84 (.97)  .76 (.70)  -.04(2.00)  1.72 (.81)  -.69 (.38)  .05 (.59)  .07 (.29) 
Malaysia -.40 (.80)  .85 (.70)  -.10(1.88)  2.48 (.89)  1.06 (.69)  -.46 (.66)  .59 (.34) 
France -.09 (.83)  .68 (.80)  .17(2.42)  -.29 (.82)  -.34 (.57)  .53 (.93)  .06 (.35) 
Canada .89 (.74)  .87 (.79)  -.18(2.26)  .86 (.88)  1.08 (.53)  -.43 (.70)  .62 (.33) 
Italy .59 (.68)  .67 (.82)  -.18(2.21)  -.58 (.82) -.13 (.72) .38 (.90)  .17 (.36) 
Netherlands -.97 (.70) .46 (.86)  .17(2.14)  -.04 (.89) -.45 (.58) .26 (.97) -.19 (.35) 
Taiwan -.72 (1.45) -.03 (.75)  -.03 (.97)  .24 (.49) -.01 (.65)  -.01 (.34) 
Sweden .07 (.65)  .81 (.78)  1.04(4.77)  -.60 (.69)  .91 (.76)  .41 (.76)  .31 (.34) 
South Korea  .24(1.97)  .67 (.94)  .96 (.89)  -.62 (.91)  .33 (.53) 
Thailand .39 (.84)  .21 (.81)  .30 (.58) 
Indonesia   
Saudi Arabia   
Belgium-Lux. -.56 (.79)  1.35 (.85)  .15(2.03)  -.31 (.61)  .46 (.83)  .17 (.39) 
India .31 (.76)  1.39 (.77)  1.69 (.74)  -.20 (.60)  .74 (.36) 
China   
PNG -.61 (.83)  .78 (.82)  .10(1.82)  12.24 (.59)  4.10(1.54)  4.85(9.47)  4.44 (.45) 
Philippines .03 (.83)  .00(1.07)  .02 (.66) 
South Africa  .34 (.49)  .79 (.60)  .30 (.69)  1.35(1.65)  .56 (.35) 
UAE -4.03 (.60)  -.94 (.69)  -2.59 (.45) 
Spain -.43 (.30)  .31 (.96)  -.25 (.33) 
Euro-zone  .54 (.77) .54 (.77) 
Vietnam  -.65 (.48) -.65 (.48) 
B. Import weights 
USA 1.23  (.72)  -.32 (.54)  .03(1.61) .23(.42)  -.54 (.97)     .15 (.31) 
Germany -.64  (.86)  1.09 (.73)  .01(2.08) -.50(.47)  .59 (.99)     .05 (.36) 
Japan -.99  (.53)  -.19 (.53)  -.45(1.51)  -1.09(.35)  .08 (.85)     -.66 (.26) 
UK .24  (.52)  -.84 (.67)  .51(3.06)  -.34(.52)  .02 (.65)     -.17 (.31) 
Switzerland -1.34  (.74) -.18 (.94) -.09(2.34)  -.74(.57)  .23 (.91)     -.46 (.51) 
New Zealand  -.92  (.67)  .73 (.72)  .51(2.64)  .09(.58)  -.05 (1.09)     -.01 (.38) 
Hong Kong  -1.64  (.76)  .40 (.71)  .60(2.85)  -1.26(.51)  .18 (.77)     -.57 (.35) 
Singapore -.92  (1.00)  .78 (.68)  -.06(2.15)  .52(.42)  .06 (.69)    .22 (.33) 
Malaysia -.48  (.82)  .87 (.67)  -.12(2.04) 2.78(.62)  -.45 (.74)     .73 (.36) 
France -.17  (.84)  .70 (.78)  .15(2.56)  -.46(.48)  .54 (.96)     .06 (.37) 
Canada .81  (.74)  .89 (.77)  -.20(2.34)  1.72(.49)  -.42 (.80)     .80 (.35) 
Italy .51  (.67)  .68 (.78)  -.20(2.39)  -.45(.55)  .39 (.93)     .19 (.37) 
Netherlands -1.05  (.69)  .47 (.82)  .16(2.28)  -.41(.51)  .27 (.99)     -.23 (.37) 
Taiwan -.80  (1.46)  -.02 (.74)      .29(.49)  .00 (.76)     .00 (.37) 
Sweden -.01  (.64)  .83 (.75)  1.02(4.78)  .58(.57)  .42 (.82)     .47 (.37) 
South Korea      .22(2.08)  1.47(.73)  -.61 (1.03)     .55 (.62) 
Thailand         1.85(.69)  .22 (.87)     .22 (.87) 
Indonesia                 
Saudi Arabia                  
Belgium-Lux. -.64  (.79)  1.36 (.82) .14(2.18) -.33(.51)  .47 (.87)     .36 (.49) 
            (continued to next page) 
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TABLE A3 (continued) 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF COUNTRY COMPONENTS OF MODEL (3.1) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Sub-period  Country 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  Mean 
India .23  (.74)  1.41  (.75)  2.95 (.63)  -.19 (.70)  .47  (.42) 
China    
PNG -.70  (.85)  .79  (.81)  .08(1.95)  12.32(2.09)  4.86 (9.41)    1.89  (.64) 
Philippines 1.32 (.81)  .01 (1.13)  .01  (1.13) 
South Africa  .25 (.49)  .80  (.58)  2.11 (.88) 1.36 (1.72)  .62  (.40) 
UAE -6.31 (.71)  -.93 (.77)  -.93  (.77) 
Spain -1.18 (.34)  .32 (.98)  .32  (.98) 
Euro-zone .55 (.73)  .55  (.73) 
Vietnam  -.64 (.60) -.64  (.60) 
C. Export weights 
USA 1.46  (.76)  -.35 (.69)  .52 (1.17)  .21(2.28) -.29 (1.22)  -.56(2.23)  .27  (.46) 
Germany -.29  (.71)  1.02 (.86)  -.05 (.84)  -.43(2.04) -.21 (.56)  .57(1.00)  .10  (.35) 
Japan -.87  (.26)  -.09 (.34)  -1.75 (.45)  .05 (.70) -.15 (.33)  .06 (.67)  -.52  (.16) 
UK .29  (.46)  -.71 (.91)  1.27 (1.22)  -.31(1.45) -.75 (.63)  .00 (.53)  -.06  (.30) 
Switzerland -1.76  (.64)  .49(1.01)          -.37 (.65)  .21 (.91)  -.50  (.38) 
New Zealand  .39  (.66)  -.38 (.60)  -.35 (.95)  -1.78(2.65)  .49 (.43)  -.07(1.03)  .00  (.31) 
Hong Kong  -1.23  (.58)  .22 (.80)  1.41 (1.42)  .11(1.41) -2.12 (.52)  .16 (.64)  -.58  (.31) 
Singapore -.15  (.74)  .24 (.69)  1.59 (.99)  .19(1.39)  -.64 (.34)  .04 (.55)  .01  (.26) 
Malaysia .40  (.61)  .22 (.66)  1.30 (.85)  .17(1.28)  1.39 (.62)  -.47 (.64)  .50  (.30) 
France -.43  (.66)  1.24 (.81)  1.58 (.96) -.41(1.82)  -.09 (.55)  .52 (.96)  .38  (.34) 
Canada 1.00  (.63)  .97 (.85)  -.05 (.85)  -.11(1.46)  .84 (.52)  -.44 (.65)  .44  (.30) 
Italy 1.16  (.63)  .26 (.83)  1.05 (.93)  -.38(1.99)  .07 (.70)  .37 (.92)  .52  (.36) 
Netherlands -.99  (.54) .67 (.90)  -.58 (.74)  -.39(1.94)  -.17 (.57) .25 (.99) -.28  (.32) 
Taiwan -.28  (1.11)  -.34 (.77)  .14 (.84)  -.99(2.25) .21 (.45) -.02 (.58) -.07  (.32) 
Sweden -.09  (.52)  1.19 (.83)  1.03 (.94)      .88 (.73)  .40 (.75)  .59  (.32) 
South Korea          .76 (1.12)  -.34(1.32)  .46 (.79)  -.63 (.82)  .06  (.48) 
Thailand                 .43 (.75) .20 (.80) .32  (.55) 
Indonesia                            
Saudi Arabia                             
Belgium-Lux. -.35  (.62)  1.37 (.89) 1.82 (.73)     -.01 (.59)  .45 (.85)  .57 (.32) 
India 1.61  (.65)              2.00 (.69) -.21 (.56) 1.05  (.36) 
China                          
PNG -.49  (.64)  .85 (.90)  3.85 (.50)  7.60 (.77)  4.73 (1.44)  4.84(9.52)  3.17  (.36) 
Philippines                 .07 (.75)  -.01(1.04)  .04  (.62) 
South Africa  1.47  (.28)  -.21 (.53)          .75 (.66)  1.34(1.60)  .90  (.26) 
UAE                -4.52 (.63)  -.95 (.67)  -2.79  (.46) 
Spain                 -.47 (.25)  .30 (.98)  -.32  (.28) 
Euro-zone                     .53 (.87)  .53  (.87) 
Vietnam                -.66 (.41)  -.66  (.41) 
D. G7-GDP weights 
USA  -1.30 (.77)  -1.21 (.53)  1.55 (.28)  -1.37 (.90)     .00 (.26) 
Germany  3.38 (1.36)  1.49  (.95)  -1.54 (.53)  2.48(1.86)     .59 (.48) 
Japan  -1.36 (1.35)  .11  (.88)  -2.74 (.49)  .03(1.76)     -1.44 (.45) 
UK  .88 (1.40)  2.03  (.95)  -1.16 (.54)  .74(1.89)     .24 (.48) 
France  2.51 (1.40)  2.73  (.95)  -1.37 (.54)  2.48(1.88)     .84 (.48) 
Canada  -1.02 (1.41)  -1.31  (.96)  5.11 (.55)  .77(1.89)     1.86 (.49) 
Italy  2.31 (1.41)  .30  (.96)  -1.06 (.55)  1.92(1.90)     .25 (.49) 
Notes:  1. See Table A1 for the sub-periods. 




PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES IN SUB-PEIORDS OF COUNTRY COMPONENTS 
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FIGURE A6 (continued) 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES IN SUB-PEIORDS OF COUNTRY COMPONENTS 










Note: The four, five or six columns for a given country in a given panel refer to the estimated 
values of   c β   for that country in the four, five or six sub-periods. 
USA   Germany  Japan  UK  France  Canada  Italy 





AVERAGES OF PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF COUNTRY COMPONENTS 
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Note:   This figure presents for each country (i) the mean (over the sub-periods) of the preliminary estimates of   c β , 
which is represented by height of the relevant column; and (ii) the associated two-standard-error band, which 
is represented by the length of the corresponding vertical line. 
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  48
APPENDIX 4 
DIVISIA MOMEMTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND INCOMES 
 
This appendix analyses the interrelationships between real exchange rates and real incomes 
across countries by applying the methodology of Divisia moments.  This approach was introduced 
in the context of consumption economics by Theil (1967, Chap. 5). 
Consider the  n  real exchange rate log-changes from  quarter  t-1  to  t,   1t nt Dr , ,Dr … .  If  
c w   is the weight applicable to country  c,  the weighted (or Divisia) mean of these exchange rate 
changes is  
n
c1 tc c t DR w Dr = =∑ ,  while the corresponding second-order moment is the Divisia 
variance  
2 n
c1 rt c ct t Vw ( D r D R ) = =− ∑ ,  which measures the extend to which exchange rates change 
disproportionately.  Next, let   1t nt Dy , ,Dy …   be the log-changes in real GDP per capita in the  n  
countries, with Divisia moments  
n
c1 tc c t DY w Dy = =∑ ,  
2 n
c1 yt c ct t Vw ( D y D Y ) = =− ∑ .  This   t DY   is 
the average growth in per capita GDP for the  n  countries,  while   yt V   measures the dispersion of 
growth. 
The productivity-bias hypothesis associated with Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) states 
that because of faster productivity growth in the production of traded goods in comparison to that in 
nontraded goods, the currencies of rich countries tend to be overvalued, while those for poor 
countries are undervalued.  In terms of our framework which is formulated in terms of changes over 
time, this means that if country  c  is growing rapidly, then the real value of its currency appreciates 
relative to the average of all rates, so that   ct t Dr DR 0 − < .  Conversely, if  c  is not growing rapidly,  
ct t Dr DR 0 −> .  We interpret the term “growing rapidly” as meaning that country  c  grows faster 
than average,   ct t Dy DY 0 −> ,  so that “not growing rapidly” means   ct t Dy DY 0 −< .  It is then 
possible to summarise the average interaction between exchange rates and incomes over the  n  
countries by a weighted covariance with weights reflecting the relative importance of countries.  




ryt c ct t ct t
c1
V w (Dr DR )(Dy DY )
=
=−− ∑ .     
 
The productivity-bias hypothesis implies that  ryt V  is negative. 
Next, to present an uncluttered, clear picture, we eliminate the time dimension by averaging 
and define for any variable   ct x   its average over time  
T
t1 cc t x( 1 / T )x = • = ∑ .  If the weighted  
  49
covariance of equation (A4.1) is negative, then when we plot   cc w (Dr DR ) •• −   against   
cc w( D y D Y ) •• −   for  c1 , , n = …   countries, the points should be scattered around a downward-
sloping line.  Figure A8 gives the results using the data described in Appendix 1 pertaining to  
n2 6 =  countries, and GDP from the Penn World Table (Summers and Heston, 1991) for the various 
weights and sub-periods described in the text.  As can be seen, most of the regression lines are 
downward sloping, as expected.  This is especially the case for the first (1970-1974) and last (1999-
2002) sub-periods.  Positive correlations are found for sub-period 3 when trade, import and export 
weighting schemes are used, and for sub-period 2 with G7-GDP weights.  Referring back to Table 
A1, we find that these positive correlations refer to the mid-1980s when the US dollar was rapidly 
appreciating against most currencies.  During this time even the currencies of fast-growing 
countries depreciated, so that many countries are located in the first quadrant in the relevant graphs 
in Figure A8. 
The last column of Figure A8 presents the same graphs when the observations are pooled 
over all sub-periods.  It can be seen that the correlations for the trade, import and export weights are 
in the range of -0.07 to -0.13.  For the G7-GDP weights, as the correlation in sub-period 2 is a large 
positive value, we consider the seven observations of this sub-period to be outliers.  Pooling the 
remaining 21 observations yields a correlation of -0.14 (see the last graph in the last column of 
Figure A8). 
To summarise, the evidence from the covariation of exchange rates and incomes is generally 
supportive of the productivity-bias hypothesis.  
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FIGURE A8 
RELATIVE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND INCOMES 
 
Sub-period  Weighting 
scheme 
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  Excluding  sub-period  2
 
Notes:  1. See Table A1 for the sub-periods. 
2. The variable on each vertical axis is  cc w (Dr DR ) 100 •• −× , while that on the horizontal axis is   cc w (Dy DY ) 100 •• −× . 
3. The correlation  ρ  is computed as  ry r y V/V V ρ= ,  where   c ry c c c V w (Dr DR )(Dy DY ) • ••• =−− ∑ , 
2
c rc c Vw ( D r D R ) •• =− ∑ , and 
2
c yc c Vw ( D y D Y ) • • =− ∑ .     
ρ = -0.62 
ρ = -0.01 
ρ = -0.09  ρ = 0.26  ρ = -0.15 
ρ = -0.64  ρ = 0.03  ρ = 0.003 ρ = 0.35  ρ = -0.17  ρ = -0.40 
ρ = -0.60  ρ = 0.16  ρ = -0.39 
ρ = 0.38  ρ = 0.005 
ρ = -0.42  ρ = -0.13 
ρ = -0.11 
ρ = -0.07 
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FINAL ESTIMATES OF MODEL (6.2) 
FOR FOUR SETS OF WEIGHTS 
 
This section provides the final estimation results for model (6.2) with the four sets of 
weights.  These results correspond to those of Section 6.  
Table A4, which corresponds to Table 8, gives four the estimated REER indexes in levels and 
changes.  It can be seen again that the four sets of results are fairly similar.  In addition, the point 
estimates are the same as their preliminary counterparts displayed in Table A2.  But as the standard 
errors of the estimated changes are smaller, there is an improvement in precision.   
The counterparts of panels A and B of Figure 4 are split into two figures -- Figure A9 
presents the histograms of the  t estimates α−  and Figure A10 their t-ratios.  Figure A11, 
corresponding to Figure 5, shows the four versions of the fan chart of the changes in the index.  
Figure A12 contains the fan charts of the indexes in levels, which correspond to Figure 6. 
Table A5 presents the estimates of country-specific parameters   c β   for the three groups of 
countries.  For the four sets of weights, the  c estimates β −  for fast-growing countries are all 




TABLE A4  
FINAL ESTIMATES OF MODEL (6.2) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights  




Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
1  1970  (1)  150.46 (7.58)    146.63 (7.67)    162.08 (7.32)         
2    (2)  149.72 (7.61)  -0.50 (0.45)  145.83 (7.70) -0.54 (0.45)  161.40  (7.35) -0.42 (0.38)       
3    (3)  148.66 (7.66)  -0.71 (0.37)  144.78 (7.76) -0.72 (0.32)  160.27  (7.40) -0.70 (0.39)       
4    (4)  148.32 (7.67)  -0.23 (0.34)  144.51 (7.77) -0.19 (0.37)  159.81  (7.42) -0.29 (0.29)       
5  1971  (1)  147.80 (7.69)  -0.35 (0.40)  143.87 (7.79) -0.44 (0.43)  159.28  (7.44) -0.33 (0.38)       
6    (2)  147.41 (7.71)  -0.27 (0.44)  143.21 (7.82) -0.46 (0.54)  158.92  (7.45) -0.22 (0.34)       
7    (3) 148.17  (7.66) 0.51 (0.33)  143.84  (7.78) 0.44 (0.40)  159.54  (7.42) 0.39 (0.29)       
8    (4) 150.16  (7.54) 1.34 (0.83)  146.09  (7.64) 1.56 (0.76)  160.88  (7.34) 0.83 (0.86)       
9  1972  (1)  147.68 (7.62)  -1.67 (1.27)  144.13 (7.71) -1.35 (1.17)  157.22  (7.47) -2.30 (1.25)       
10    (2)  146.64 (7.68)  -0.70 (0.20)  143.17 (7.76) -0.67 (0.24)  155.94  (7.53) -0.82 (0.16)       
11    (3) 148.12  (7.58) 1.00 (0.73)  145.07  (7.63) 1.32 (0.93)  156.99  (7.47) 0.67 (0.57)       
12    (4) 148.77  (7.55) 0.44 (0.27)  146.01  (7.58) 0.65 (0.31)  157.34  (7.45) 0.22 (0.22)       
13 1973  (1) 162.61  (6.86) 8.89 (1.30)  160.02  (6.88) 9.16 (1.20)  170.58  (6.83) 8.08 (1.25)       
14    (2) 164.94  (6.71) 1.42 (1.51)  162.48  (6.72) 1.53 (1.46)  171.75  (6.74) 0.68 (1.39)       
15    (3) 166.35  (6.62) 0.85 (0.95)  163.85  (6.62) 0.84 (1.20)  172.67  (6.68) 0.53 (1.01)       
16    (4) 176.77  (6.22) 6.08 (0.68)  174.82  (6.19) 6.48 (0.76)  182.93  (6.29) 5.77 (0.74)       
17 1974  (1) 179.99  (6.10) 1.81 (0.65)  178.55  (6.04) 2.11 (0.76)  185.81  (6.19) 1.56 (0.58)       
18    (2)  174.87 (6.24)  -2.89 (1.15)  173.22 (6.18) -3.03 (1.34)  180.29  (6.36) -3.02 (0.88)       
19    (3) 180.15  (6.00) 2.98 (1.48)  178.32  (5.96) 2.90 (1.27)  186.54  (6.09) 3.41 (1.56)       
20    (4)  160.70 (6.72)  -11.43 (0.53)  158.74 (6.69) -11.63 (0.49) 166.66  (6.80) -11.27 (0.59)       
21 1975  (1) 163.74  (6.56) 1.87 (1.07)  161.22  (6.54) 1.55 (1.25)  169.45  (6.67) 1.66 (0.90)       
22    (2) 164.73  (6.52) 0.60 (0.52)  162.15  (6.49) 0.57 (0.64)  170.15  (6.63) 0.41 (0.59)       
23    (3)  162.28 (6.57)  -1.50 (1.21)  160.11 (6.53) -1.27 (1.24)  168.25  (6.68) -1.12 (1.05)       
24    (4) 167.44  (6.36) 3.13 (0.54)  165.11  (6.32) 3.08 (0.49)  174.56  (6.43) 3.68 (0.63)       
25 1976  (1) 168.42  (6.32) 0.58 (0.38)  166.21  (6.28) 0.66 (0.39)  175.46  (6.39) 0.51 (0.35)       
26    (2)  167.96 (6.30)  -0.27 (1.12)  166.40 (6.22) 0.12 (1.29)  174.07  (6.41)  -0.80 (1.09)       
27    (3) 169.16  (6.25) 0.71 (0.64)  167.93  (6.15) 0.91 (0.61)  174.58  (6.38) 0.29 (0.72)       
28    (4)  158.50 (6.66)  -6.51 (0.51)  157.27 (6.55) -6.56 (0.73)  163.57  (6.80) -6.51 (0.43)       
29  1977 (1)  148.60 (7.08)  -6.45 (0.86)  147.30 (6.96) -6.55 (1.00)  153.23  (7.25) -6.53 (0.73)       
30   (2) 148.71  (7.04) 0.08 (0.96)  147.63  (6.92) 0.23 (0.87)  152.65  (7.24)  -0.38 (1.09)       
31    (3)  147.11 (7.11)  -1.08 (0.60)  146.17 (6.98) -0.99 (0.56)  150.52  (7.33) -1.41 (0.65)       
32    (4)  145.67 (7.10)  -0.99 (1.53)  145.00 (6.97) -0.80 (1.39)  147.90  (7.37) -1.76 (1.69)       
33  1978 (1)  143.37 (7.19)  -1.59 (0.95)  142.32 (7.06) -1.87 (1.12)  145.61  (7.47) -1.55 (0.72)       
34    (2)  140.08 (7.26)  -2.32 (1.68)  139.89 (7.10) -1.72 (1.56)  140.89  (7.59) -3.30 (1.97)       
35    (3)  135.07 (7.31)  -3.64 (2.43)  135.41 (7.16) -3.25 (2.12)  134.30  (7.69) -4.79 (2.80)       
(continued on next page)  
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TABLE A4 (continued) 
FINAL ESTIMATES OF MODEL (6.2) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 




Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
36   (4)  133.65  (7.38) -1.06 (0.51)  133.75  (7.24) -1.24 (0.62)  133.07  (7.75) -0.92 (0.51)         
37 1979 (1) 133.01  (7.30)  -0.48 (1.68)  132.46  (7.22) -0.97 (1.47)  133.70  (7.58)  0.47 (1.94)         
38   (2)  132.53  (7.19) -0.36 (1.91)  131.44  (7.16) -0.77 (1.72)  134.66  (7.36)  0.71 (2.13)         
39   (3)  132.30  (7.12) -0.18 (1.43)  130.44  (7.10) -0.76 (1.66)  135.41  (7.25)  0.56 (1.26)         
40   (4)  131.87  (6.95) -0.32 (2.19)  129.46  (7.01) -0.75 (1.88)  136.45  (6.95)  0.76 (2.57)         
41 1980 (1) 130.60  (6.96)  -0.97 (1.11)  127.84  (7.04) -1.26 (1.10) 135.95  (6.92)  -0.37 (1.20) 127.38  (8.33)     
42   (2)  130.35  (6.91) -0.19 (1.19)  127.93  (6.98)  0.07 (1.09) 135.03  (6.88)  -0.68 (1.45) 128.13  (8.26)  0.59 (0.86) 
43   (3)  131.58  (6.80)  0.94 (1.07)  129.29  (6.87)  1.06 (1.03) 135.71  (6.80)  0.50 (1.05) 130.22  (8.08)  1.62 (1.15) 
44   (4)  132.03  (6.73)  0.34 (1.06)  130.39  (6.75)  0.85 (1.10) 135.53  (6.76)  -0.14 (1.19) 131.97  (7.92)  1.34 (1.19) 
45 1981 (1) 134.68  (6.56)  1.99 (0.91)  133.52  (6.55)  2.37 (1.00) 137.89  (6.61)  1.73 (0.91) 135.89  (7.63)  2.93 (1.35) 
46   (2)  137.77  (6.29) 2.27 (1.72)  136.58  (6.29)  2.26 (1.68) 141.79  (6.34)  2.79 (1.49) 138.62  (7.32)  1.98 (2.14) 
47   (3)  144.03  (5.84) 4.44 (2.09)  143.07  (5.80)  4.64 (2.21) 148.66  (5.94)  4.73 (1.69) 143.39  (6.91)  3.39 (2.17) 
48   (4)  141.87  (5.91)  -1.51 (0.79)  140.65  (5.86)  -1.70 (0.94) 146.09  (6.02)  -1.75 (0.67) 141.04  (6.94)  -1.65 (1.49) 
49 1982 (1) 139.63  (5.95)  -1.59 (1.04)  138.25  (5.93) -1.72 (0.90) 144.55  (6.04)  -1.06 (1.10) 138.45  (7.03)  -1.85 (1.03) 
50   (2)  138.90  (5.94)  -0.53 (1.06)  137.29  (5.93)  -0.69 (0.93) 144.52  (6.00)  -0.02 (1.08) 136.96  (7.07)  -1.08 (1.02) 
51   (3)  136.01  (5.96)  -2.10 (1.48)  134.30  (5.98)  -2.21 (1.32) 142.34  (5.99)  -1.52 (1.52) 133.73  (7.13)  -2.39 (1.67) 
52   (4)  134.67  (6.01)  -1.00 (0.46)  133.13  (6.02)  -0.87 (0.52) 140.54  (6.06)  -1.28 (0.40) 131.75  (7.24)  -1.49 (0.34) 
53 1983 (1) 132.06  (5.96)  -1.95 (1.93)  130.97  (5.94) -1.64 (1.93) 136.58  (6.06)  -2.86 (1.95) 129.69  (7.23)  -1.57 (1.71) 
54   (2)  125.01  (6.28)  -5.48 (0.47)  123.82  (6.27)  -5.62 (0.51) 129.62  (6.37)  -5.23 (0.50) 122.51  (7.63)  -5.70 (0.79) 
55   (3)  129.62  (6.00) 3.62 (1.12)  128.26  (6.02)  3.52 (0.88) 134.40  (6.12)  3.62 (0.66) 126.63  (7.32)  3.31 (1.21) 
56   (4)  134.26  (5.77) 3.52 (0.63)  133.19  (5.76)  3.78 (0.79) 138.59  (5.90)  3.07 (0.90) 131.60  (7.02)  3.85 (0.68) 
57 1984 (1) 137.76  (5.61)  2.57 (0.44)  136.79  (5.61)  2.66 (0.31) 141.84  (5.76)  2.32 (0.33) 135.37  (6.82)  2.83 (0.34) 
58   (2)  134.29  (5.75)  -2.55 (0.33)  133.43  (5.75)  -2.48 (0.26) 138.14  (5.91)  -2.64 (0.24) 132.07  (6.99)  -2.47 (0.24) 
59   (3)  130.97  (5.69)  -2.50 (2.03)  130.00  (5.73)  -2.60 (1.79) 135.45  (5.91)  -1.97 (1.58) 127.11  (7.09)  -3.83 (1.99) 
60   (4)  135.06  (5.48) 3.08 (0.86)  134.31  (5.52)  3.26 (0.84) 139.50  (5.73)  2.95 (0.49) 130.79  (6.85)  2.86 (1.00) 
61 1985 (1) 125.06  (5.79)  -7.70 (1.55)  124.36  (5.87) -7.70 (1.27) 129.42  (6.11)  -7.50 (1.08) 120.47  (7.31)  -8.22 (1.67) 
62   (2)  110.10  (6.50)  -12.74 (1.08)  109.35 (6.59)  -12.86 (1.13)  114.15 (6.88)  -12.55 (0.91) 105.80  (8.20) -12.98 (1.47) 
63   (3)  112.80  (6.27) 2.42 (1.09)  111.99  (6.35)  2.38 (1.22) 116.69  (6.64)  2.20 (1.30) 108.87  (7.85)  2.86 (1.52) 
64   (4)  105.86  (6.35)  -6.35 (2.22)  105.58  (6.38)  -5.89 (2.28) 108.68  (6.66)  -7.11 (2.74) 102.98  (7.88)  -5.56 (2.66) 
65 1986 (1) 105.89  (6.19)  0.03 (1.51)  105.88  (6.16)  0.28 (1.65) 108.53  (6.42)  -0.14 (1.97) 102.71  (7.63)  -0.27 (2.14) 
66   (2)  104.75  (6.07)  -1.09 (1.56)  105.04  (6.01)  -0.80 (1.65) 106.72  (6.22)  -1.68 (2.08) 102.29  (7.47)  -0.41 (1.74) 
67   (3)  90.27  (6.88)  -14.87 (1.36) 90.61 (6.78)  -14.78 (1.44)  91.99 (6.89)  -14.85 (1.98) 87.69  (8.52) -15.40 (1.57) 
68   (4)  97.05  (6.04) 7.23 (2.07) 96.69  (6.17)  6.49 (1.48) 99.76  (5.89)  8.10 (2.38) 92.56  (8.01)  5.40 (0.91) 
69 1987 (1)  98.41  (5.87)  1.40 (0.96)  97.92  (6.00)  1.27 (1.06) 101.15  (5.76)  1.39 (0.78) 93.96  (7.70)  1.51 (1.63) 
70   (2)  102.29  (5.57) 3.86 (0.98)  101.92  (5.64)  4.00 (1.17) 104.43  (5.32)  3.19 (1.74) 98.89  (7.22)  5.11 (1.19) 
                  (continued  on  next  page)  
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TABLE A4 (continued) 
FINAL ESTIMATES OF MODEL (6.2) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 




Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) 
71    (3)  103.86 (5.34)  1.53 (1.29)  103.31 (5.50)  1.36 (0.91) 106.14  (5.19)  1.62 (0.77) 100.78  (7.04)  1.89 (0.82) 
72    (4)  98.76 (5.52)  -5.03 (1.02)  98.35 (5.64)  -4.92 (1.22)  101.00 (5.33)  -4.96 (1.16)  96.21 (7.16)  -4.64 (1.69) 
73  1988  (1)  99.76 (5.44)  1.00 (0.51)  99.46 (5.53)  1.12 (0.75) 101.52  (5.25)  0.52 (0.75) 97.88  (6.99)  1.73 (0.81) 
74    (2)  107.76 (5.02)  7.72 (0.48)  107.55 (5.09)  7.82 (0.47) 109.27  (4.85)  7.35 (0.50) 106.33  (6.41)  8.28 (0.50) 
75    (3)  116.78 (4.34)  8.04 (1.89)  116.42 (4.50)  7.93 (1.58) 118.10  (4.36)  7.77 (1.29) 114.82  (5.63)  7.69 (2.19) 
76    (4)  120.17 (4.12)  2.86 (1.09)  119.71 (4.31)  2.79 (0.97) 121.42  (4.14)  2.78 (1.10) 117.97  (5.37)  2.70 (1.26) 
77  1989  (1)  124.19 (3.92)  3.29 (0.87)  123.68 (4.10)  3.26 (0.89) 125.54  (3.92)  3.33 (1.02) 121.51  (5.15)  2.96 (0.97) 
78    (2)  117.47 (4.04)  -5.56 (1.08)  117.08 (4.21)  -5.49 (1.19) 118.78  (4.00)  -5.54 (1.28) 115.05  (5.31)  -5.47 (1.38) 
79    (3)  116.98 (4.01)  -0.42 (0.76)  116.54 (4.18)  -0.46 (0.79) 118.44  (3.93)  -0.29 (0.96) 114.42  (5.30)  -0.54 (0.72) 
80    (4)  119.80 (3.89)  2.38 (0.48)  119.00 (4.06)  2.09 (0.63) 121.62  (3.81)  2.65 (0.49) 116.24  (5.16)  1.57 (0.89) 
81  1990  (1)  117.68 (3.83)  -1.79 (1.21)  116.31 (3.99)  -2.28 (1.32) 120.13  (3.69)  -1.24 (1.33) 112.84  (5.16)  -2.96 (1.45) 
82    (2)  119.66 (3.67)  1.67 (1.02)  117.95 (3.83)  1.40 (1.08) 122.62  (3.49)  2.05 (1.17) 113.95  (5.04)  0.98 (0.96) 
83    (3)  121.55 (3.50)  1.57 (1.08)  119.76 (3.66)  1.52 (1.12) 124.50  (3.34)  1.52 (0.98) 116.13  (4.78)  1.89 (1.47) 
84    (4)  113.34 (3.31)  -7.00 (1.99)  111.76 (3.57)  -6.91 (1.81) 115.73  (3.10)  -7.30 (2.11) 108.62  (4.76)  -6.68 (2.01) 
85  1991  (1)  113.93 (3.26)  0.52 (0.59)  112.29 (3.49)  0.48 (0.74) 116.44  (3.02)  0.60 (0.70) 108.81  (4.69)  0.17 (0.86) 
86    (2)  116.96 (3.05)  2.62 (1.01)  115.82 (3.14)  3.09 (1.47) 119.04  (2.89)  2.21 (0.77) 112.72  (4.03)  3.53 (2.32) 
87    (3)  119.19 (2.97)  1.89 (0.42)  117.86 (3.07)  1.75 (0.30) 121.35  (2.81)  1.92 (0.46) 114.53  (3.96)  1.59 (0.18) 
88    (4)  115.53 (2.91)  -3.12 (1.11)  114.04 (3.04)  -3.29 (1.04) 117.70  (2.73)  -3.05 (1.13) 110.71  (3.87)  -3.39 (1.50) 
89  1992  (1)  110.60 (3.01)  -4.36 (0.48)  109.06 (3.16)  -4.47 (0.37) 112.75  (2.81)  -4.30 (0.54) 105.78  (4.04)  -4.56 (0.23) 
90    (2)  111.57 (2.91)  0.88 (0.73)  109.70 (3.10)  0.59 (0.58) 113.96  (2.68)  1.07 (0.82) 106.07  (4.02)  0.28 (0.35) 
91    (3)  104.46 (3.01)  -6.59 (0.82)  102.49 (3.17)  -6.80 (1.00) 106.89  (2.80)  -6.41 (0.63) 98.93  (3.96)  -6.97 (1.69) 
92    (4)  102.05 (2.62)  -2.33 (1.65)  100.67 (2.58)  -1.79 (1.94) 103.76  (2.56)  -2.97 (1.38) 97.58  (3.11)  -1.37 (2.47) 
93  1993  (1)  101.95 (2.44)  -0.09 (0.98)  100.74 (2.33)  0.07 (1.12) 103.31  (2.44)  -0.44 (0.83) 97.59  (2.71)  0.00 (1.49) 
94    (2)  99.80 (1.64)  -2.14 (1.87)  98.83 (1.65)  -1.92 (1.69)  100.69 (1.58)  -2.57 (1.95)  96.35 (2.10)  -1.28 (1.71) 
95    (3)  95.95 (1.32)  -3.93 (1.03)  95.38 (1.38)  -3.56 (0.96) 96.39  (1.29) -4.36 (1.00)  93.48 (1.87)  -3.02 (1.02) 
96    (4)  96.50 (1.22)  0.57 (0.49)  95.95 (1.23)  0.60 (0.59) 96.97  (1.10)  0.61 (0.64)  94.17 (1.69)  0.73 (0.71) 
97  1994  (1)  101.86 (1.11)  5.41 (0.32)  101.43 (1.11)  5.56 (0.37) 102.28  (0.96)  5.33 (0.41) 99.84  (1.54)  5.85 (0.41) 
98    (2)  101.71 (0.77)  -0.15 (0.81)  101.41 (0.83)  -0.03 (0.74) 101.94  (0.65)  -0.34 (0.73) 100.12  (1.19)  0.28 (0.98) 
99    (3)  101.01 (0.49)  -0.69 (0.61)  100.81 (0.48)  -0.59 (0.69) 101.10  (0.52)  -0.82 (0.41) 99.98  (0.55)  -0.14 (1.05) 
100    (4)  102.38 (0.35)  1.35 (0.34)  102.26 (0.34)  1.42 (0.33) 102.48  (0.27)  1.35 (0.45) 101.79  (0.49)  1.80 (0.23) 
101  1995  (1)  100.00 (0.00)  -2.35 (0.35)  100.00 (0.00)  -2.23 (0.35) 100.00  (0.00)  -2.45 (0.27) 100.00  (0.00)  -1.78 (0.50) 
102    (2)  92.60 (2.10)  -7.69 (2.27)  93.07 (2.00)  -7.18 (2.15) 91.96  (2.10) -8.38 (2.28)  94.10 (2.10)  -6.08 (2.23) 
103    (3)  97.74 (3.07)  5.41 (2.16)  97.95 (2.98)  5.11 (2.15) 97.59  (3.30)  5.95 (2.49)  98.16 (2.98)  4.22 (2.06) 
104    (4)  100.96 (3.49)  3.24 (1.47)  100.82 (3.42)  2.88 (1.51) 101.35  (3.82)  3.77 (1.68) 100.55  (3.36)  2.41 (1.40) 
105  1996  (1)  103.42 (3.73)  2.41 (1.01)  103.24 (3.68)  2.37 (1.08) 103.98  (4.12)  2.57 (1.22) 102.78  (3.63)  2.19 (1.13) 
                  (continued  on  next  page)  
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TABLE A4 (continued) 
FINAL ESTIMATES OF MODEL (6.2) 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Weights 




Level Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  Level  Change  t α  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
106    (2) 108.79  (3.95) 5.06 (0.39)  108.75  (3.91)  5.20 (0.49) 109.32  (4.37)  5.00 (0.52) 108.46  (3.88)  5.38 (0.58) 
107    (3)  108.60 (3.97)  -0.18 (0.45)  108.35 (3.93)  -0.37 (0.50) 109.36  (4.42)  0.04 (0.57) 107.91  (3.89)  -0.51 (0.47) 
108    (4) 110.36  (4.13) 1.61 (0.80)  109.93  (4.11)  1.45 (0.90) 111.37  (4.62)  1.81 (0.93) 109.37  (4.05)  1.34 (0.83) 
109  1997  (1) 112.33  (4.48) 1.77 (1.38)  111.82  (4.56)  1.70 (1.62) 113.57  (5.01)  1.96 (1.50) 111.00  (4.68)  1.48 (2.02) 
110    (2)  110.74 (4.52)  -1.43 (0.85)  110.39 (4.57)  -1.28 (0.74) 111.71  (5.02)  -1.65 (0.85) 109.83  (4.70)  -1.06 (0.72) 
111    (3)  107.35 (4.50)  -3.10 (0.99)  106.89 (4.52)  -3.23 (0.87) 108.21  (4.99)  -3.18 (1.02) 105.92  (4.61)  -3.63 (0.83) 
112    (4)  105.64 (4.76)  -1.61 (1.65)  103.54 (4.66)  -3.18 (1.52) 107.88  (5.33)  -0.31 (1.78) 100.04  (4.52)  -5.71 (1.21) 
113  1998  (1) 106.30  (5.14) 0.62 (1.75)  102.96  (4.83)  -0.56 (1.34) 109.54  (5.90)  1.53 (2.15) 97.57  (4.46)  -2.50 (0.68) 
114    (2)  100.95 (5.16)  -5.17 (1.66)  97.96 (4.79)  -4.98 (1.38) 104.13  (6.03)  -5.07 (2.12) 92.67  (4.32)  -5.15 (0.92) 
115    (3)  97.55 (5.04)  -3.43 (0.78)  94.43 (4.68)  -3.67 (0.83) 100.87  (5.91)  -3.18 (0.93) 88.67  (4.17)  -4.41 (0.62) 
116    (4)  95.41 (5.58)  -2.22 (2.74)  92.96 (5.21)  -1.56 (2.61) 97.83  (6.35) -3.06 (2.79)  88.60 (4.92)  -0.08 (2.95) 
117  1999  (1)  99.25 (6.18)  3.95 (2.14)  97.05 (5.79)  4.30 (2.03) 101.41  (6.99)  3.59 (2.31) 91.19  (5.12)  2.88 (0.82) 
118    (2) 104.27  (6.53) 4.93 (0.63)  102.08  (6.13)  5.06 (0.74) 106.38  (7.36)  4.79 (0.56) 95.92  (5.46)  5.06 (0.94) 
119    (3)  103.32 (6.59)  -0.91 (1.21)  101.34 (6.18)  -0.73 (1.05) 105.17  (7.42)  -1.14 (1.41) 95.19  (5.52)  -0.77 (1.09) 
120    (4)  100.80 (6.62)  -2.47 (1.56)  99.22 (6.21)  -2.11 (1.39) 102.17  (7.43)  -2.90 (1.76) 93.15  (5.58)  -2.17 (1.52) 
121  2000  (1)  100.44 (6.63)  -0.36 (0.70)  98.98 (6.23)  -0.25 (0.72) 101.67  (7.43)  -0.49 (0.75) 93.22  (5.65)  0.08 (0.89) 
122    (2)  95.19 (6.33)  -5.36 (0.75)  93.97 (5.97)  -5.19 (0.81) 96.17  (7.07) -5.56 (0.74)  88.39 (5.41)  -5.32 (0.87) 
123    (3)  94.65 (6.31)  -0.58 (0.53)  93.41 (5.95)  -0.60 (0.48) 95.64  (7.05) -0.55 (0.63)  87.43 (5.36)  -1.10 (0.44) 
124    (4)  90.00 (6.03)  -5.03 (0.59)  88.67 (5.67)  -5.21 (0.58) 91.14  (6.75) -4.83 (0.64)  82.35 (5.08)  -5.98 (0.59) 
125  2001  (1)  91.16 (6.32)  1.28 (1.79)  89.15 (5.91)  0.55 (1.75) 93.10  (7.10)  2.13 (1.83) 82.31  (5.25)  -0.05 (1.65) 
126    (2)  90.75 (6.31)  -0.46 (0.54)  88.67 (5.90)  -0.54 (0.63) 92.78  (7.09) -0.34 (0.44)  81.37 (5.24)  -1.15 (0.88) 
127    (3)  90.76 (6.32)  0.01 (0.41)  88.62 (5.91)  -0.06 (0.48) 92.86  (7.10)  0.09 (0.37)  81.23 (5.25)  -0.18 (0.53) 
128    (4)  91.33 (6.37)  0.63 (0.40)  88.92 (5.95)  0.34 (0.43) 93.72  (7.17)  0.92 (0.36)  81.32 (5.26)  0.11 (0.34) 
129  2002  (1)  94.52 (6.68)  3.43 (1.12)  91.71 (6.20) 3.09 (0.97)  97.36  (7.55) 3.82 (1.26)       
130    (2)  97.61 (6.96)  3.22 (0.95)  94.86 (6.50)  3.38 (1.15) 100.37  (7.83)  3.04 (0.79)       
Mean of  t α  -0.34       -0.34       -0.37       -0.52  
Percentage of  t α  which are 
 significant at the 5 % level  45     46  47 54
Notes:  1.  This table corresponds to Table 8. 
  2.   The entries in columns 5, 7, 9 and 11 are to be divided by 100. 
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FIGURE A9  
HISTOGRAMS OF ESTIMATES OF  t α   × 100 
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Notes:  1. This figure corresponds to Panel A of Figure 4. 
  2. All estimated   t α   are to be divided by 100. 
 
FIGURE A10  
HISTOGRAMS OF t-RATIOS OF  t α  
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Note:   This figure corresponds to Panel B of Figure 4. 
Mean = -.22 
SD = 4.79 
Mean = -.16 
SD = 4.96
Mean = -.36 
SD = 4.71 
Mean = -.25 
SD = 4.80 
Mean = -.34 
SD = 3.76
Mean = -.37 
SD = 3.79 
Mean = -.52 
SD = 4.04 
Mean = -.34 
SD = 3.76  
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FIGURE A11  
REER INDEX AND CONFIDENCE BANDS: CHANGES 
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Note: This figure corresponds to Figure 5. 
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FIGURE A12  
REER INDEX AND CONFIDENCE BANDS: LEVELS 
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TABLE A5  
ESTIMATES OF COUNTRY-GROUP COMPONENTS OF REER CHANGES  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 




change  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Mean 
A. Trade weights 
Fast Appreciation  -0.87(0.24) -0.12(0.46) -0.35(0.89) -1.19(0.45) -0.37(0.28) -0.81(0.34)  -0.65(0.15)
Slow Depreciation 0.92(0.22) 0.46(0.29) 1.67(0.92) 0.98(0.41) 0.24(0.28) 0.63(0.28)  0.70(0.13)
All other  -0.57(0.37) -0.08(0.20) -0.40(0.26) 0.04(0.34) -0.12(0.18) -0.18(0.37)  -0.20(0.11)
B. Import weights 
Fast Appreciation  -0.99 (0.28)  -0.11(0.52) -0.41(1.02) -0.49(0.41) -0.87(0.33)    -0.67(0.19)
Slow Depreciation  0.80 (0.22)  0.53(0.29) 1.34(0.94) 0.27(0.20) 0.65(0.26)    0.60(0.13)
All other  -0.32 (0.33)  -0.17(0.19) -0.33(0.27) -0.14(0.12) -0.18(0.39)    -0.21 (0.10)
C. Export weights 
Fast Appreciation  -0.63 (0.17)  -0.06(0.40) -  -2.34(1.25) -0.34(0.30) -0.75 (0.37)  -0.59(0.15)
Slow Depreciation  0.75 (0.19)  0.70(0.37) 1.93(0.68) 1.49(0.59) 0.55(0.32) 0.61 (0.33)  0.85(0.14)
All other  -0.25 (0.34)  -0.19(0.29) -0.33(0.12) -2.00(0.90) -0.08(0.07) -0.13 (0.36)  -0.24 (0.07)
D. G7-GDP weights 
Fast Appreciation  -1.29(0.93) -  -0.29(0.34) -0.60(0.30)     -0.57(0.24)
Slow Depreciation 2.41(1.09) -  0.64(0.38) 0.47(0.37)     0.83(0.28)
All other  -0.30(0.45) -  0.06(0.12) 0.80(0.52)     0.11(0.14)
Notes:  1.  This table corresponds to Table 9. 
  2.  See Table A1 for sub-periods. 
  3. The standard error of the mean, given in the last column, is calculated in the same way as in Table 9. 
  4. According to criteria (6.1), in sub-period 3 based on export weights, there are no fast-growing countries 
with appreciating currencies.  In sub-period 2 based on GDP weights, all countries are classified as “all 
other”, so that all   c β   are indeterminant.    
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